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VOWS TO COLLIDE:  THE BURGEONING CONFLICT BETWEEN 
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
FREDRIC J. BOLD, JR.† 
[A]ffording same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the designation 
of marriage will not impinge upon the religious freedom of any religious 
organization, official, or any other person; no religion will be required to 
change its religious policies or practices with regard to same-sex 
couples . . . .
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INTRODUCTION 
A picturesque, seaside pavilion in Ocean Grove, New Jersey, 
owned and controlled by United Methodists since its creation in 1870, 
is described in its charter as a “portion of land skirting the sea, 
consecrated to sacred uses and with a single eye to the Divine Glory.”2  
Almost 150 years later, this one-time site of religious revival meetings 
has become one of the many flashpoints nationwide between religious 
groups supporting the traditional definition of marriage and same-sex 
marriage proponents seeking to enforce antidiscrimination laws.  
Despite the Methodist group’s desire that no one use its pavilion for 
activities directly contrary to its religious identity, New Jersey’s 
Division on Civil Rights held in January 2009 that the Methodists must 
allow a lesbian couple to use the pavilion for their same-sex civil union 
ceremony.3  This finding is the subject of ongoing litigation in federal 
court.4  Using the Ocean Grove case as a prototypical harbinger of 
 
2 Leo H. Carney, Ocean Grove Tries to Keep Its Old Charm in New Times, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 29, 1986, at NJ1 (quoting the charter of the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting 
Association). 
3 Op. N.J. Att’y Gen., Div. on Civil Rights, No. PN34XB-03008 (Dec. 29, 2008), 
available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-06CMA 
.pdf; see also Associated Press, Lesbian Pair Wins Ruling over Refusal of Ceremony, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, at A22 (reporting on the New Jersey ruling that Ocean Grove’s 
refusal to host a lesbian wedding ceremony was a violation of anti-discrimination laws).   
4 After this ruling, Ocean Grove filed suit in federal district court seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the state acceptance and investigation 
of antidiscrimination suits violated Ocean Grove’s First Amendment rights.  Ocean 
Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, No. 07-
3802, 2007 WL 3349787, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007).  The district court dismissed the 
case based on abstention principles.  Id. at *6.  On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case to the federal district court to decide 
Ocean Grove’s request for declaratory relief clarifying its rights as to the use of the rest 
of its property.  Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. 
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future conflicts, this Comment explains why same-sex marriage 
antidiscrimination laws pose a genuine and sincere theological 
problem for many religious institutions and explores some of the 
possible First Amendment defenses with which religious institutions 
might respond to such laws. 
For religious groups of all stripes, a case like the pavilion 
controversy in Ocean Grove is anything but an isolated anomaly; it is 
instead a signal of an increasingly frequent wave of conflicts between 
same-sex marriage proponents and traditional religious organizations.  
The same-sex marriage movement has rapidly gained steam through 
landmark state supreme court rulings establishing a constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage or civil union despite the movement’s 
limited success in legislative spheres and, indeed, against legislative 
attempts to limit its spread.5 
To be sure, the same-sex marriage movement has been a study in 
fits and starts.  The movement’s first wave began in 1993, when state 
courts in Hawaii,6 Alaska,7 and Vermont8 recognized a constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage or civil unions.  Answering this judicial 
activity, voters in Hawaii and Alaska passed state constitutional 
amendments overturning the decisions.  Continuing the movement 
yet again a decade later—and with seemingly even greater momentum 
 
Vespa-Papaleo, Nos. 07-4253, 07-4543, 2009 WL 2048914, at *1-2 (3d Cir. July 15, 
2009). 
5 See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining 
marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C 
(2006) (providing that states need not give effect to laws in other states providing for 
same-sex marriage).  For information on state DOMAs, see infra note 85. 
6 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the state’s 
definition of marriage requiring that couples be of the opposite sex implicated the 
state’s Equal Protection Clause), reh’g granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), 
remanded sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 
1996) (striking down the state’s opposite-sex definition of marriage on Equal 
Protection grounds and finding neither a compelling state interest nor narrow 
tailoring), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. 
CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1998).   
7 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at 
*4-5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (applying strict scrutiny standard to opposite-sex 
marriage laws and finding “the decision to choose one’s life partner [is] a fundamental 
right”), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended 
1999). 
8 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the State was 
“constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and 
protections” of marriage but allowing the legislature to determine the name and form 
of the protection). 
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and success since 2006—Massachusetts,9 New Jersey,10 California,11 and 
Connecticut12 followed suit in recognizing same-sex marriage.  In 
2009, Iowa,13 the District of Columbia,14 and Vermont15 became the 
most recent additions to the same-sex marriage column, the latter two 
by legislative rather than judicial action. 
Some states, however, have successfully fought back against some 
of the judicially created same-sex marriages.  Between 2004 and 2006, 
in the wake of the Massachusetts decision, eighteen states passed state 
constitutional amendments limiting marriage to heterosexual 
couples.16  More recently, in November 2008, voters approved state 
referenda banning same-sex marriage in California, Arizona, and 
Florida.17  The Arizona amendment prevailed after having been 
 
9 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (“The 
marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the 
community for no rational reason.”). 
10 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21, 224 (N.J. 2006) (holding that state 
opposite-sex marriage laws violate New Jersey equal protection rights and providing a 
180-day deadline for establishing same-sex marriage or its equivalent).  The New Jersey 
legislature complied and established civil unions without denominating them 
marriages.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31 (West 2007).  Although concluding at the time 
that the court would “not presume that a difference in name alone is of constitutional 
magnitude,” one might expect future litigation to require calling these civil unions 
“marriages,” as the plaintiff argued in Lewis.  908 A.2d at 221-22. 
11 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435 (Cal. 2008) (holding that California 
equal protection law requires that same-sex couples have a right to “marriage” and not 
merely civil unions). 
12 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008) 
(holding under intermediate scrutiny that despite civil union laws same-sex couples 
have an equal protection right to civil marriage). 
13 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (holding unanimously 
that the state equal protection clause requires recognition of same-sex marriage). 
14 Gary Emerling, D.C. to Recognize State Gay Marriages, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, 
at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 6631146. 
15 David Abel, Vermont Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage:  11th Hour Change of Heart Ends 
Veto, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 6539576. 
16 See Daniel Burke et al., Scorecard:  Who Won, Who Lost on Election Day, CHRISTIAN 
CENTURY, Nov. 28, 2006, at 13 (describing the 2006 voter-approved amendments 
banning gay marriage in Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin); Thomas Roberts & Sean Gibbons, Same-Sex Marriage Bans 
Winning on State Ballots:  11 States Approve Constitutional Amendments to Outlaw Gay 
Nuptials, CNN.COM, Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/02/ 
ballot.samesex.marriage/index.html (reporting the 2004 voter-approved amendments 
banning gay marriage in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah). 
17 See Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, Proposition 102 Unofficial Results for the 2008 
General Election (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.azsos.gov/results/2008/general/ 
BM102.htm (citing that 56% of voters approved a constitutional amendment to limit 
marriage to opposite-sex couples); Cal. Sec’y of State’s Office, Proposition 8 Election 
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defeated in 2006—the first time an amendment to ban same-sex 
marriage had been defeated.18  In California, the state supreme court 
upheld Proposition 8 as a valid state constitutional amendment in May 
2009, but Ted Olson and David Boies have initiated a federal suit 
challenging the ban on federal equal protection grounds.19  Evident in 
this conflicting and messy recent history is every indication that, at 
least for the foreseeable future, same-sex marriage will be a reality 
alongside which religious institutions will have to operate. 
While same-sex marriage has made similar inroads in other 
countries around the world,20 the particular challenge facing same-sex 
marriage in the United States is its reception into such an historically 
and enduringly religious context—in particular, a context where 
homosexuality has traditionally been opposed on religious grounds.21  
 
Night Results (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/ 
maps/returns/props/prop-8.htm (citing 52% approval for a constitutional ban on 
same-sex marriage); Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of Elections, Proposition 2 Official Results 
(Nov. 4, 2008), http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp? 
ElectionDate=11/4/2008 (citing 62% approval for a constitutional amendment to 
limit marriage to opposite-sex couples).  
18 See Burke, supra note 16. 
19 See Bob Egelko, Judge Sets January Trial for Prop. 8 Lawsuit, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 20, 
2009, at D3. 
20 The Netherlands (2000), Belgium (2003), Spain (2005), Canada (2005), South 
Africa (2006), Norway (2008), and Sweden (2009) all permit same-sex marriage.  See 
THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, GAY MARRIAGE AROUND THE WORLD 
(2009), http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=423; see also Kees Waaldijk, Others May 
Follow:  The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex 
Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 585-89 (2004) (discussing steps 
taken by European countries to recognize same-sex relationships). 
21 See, e.g., Adelle M. Banks, Think You Know What Americans Believe About Religion?  
You Might Want to Think Again, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE, June 23, 2008, 
http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=15907 (finding that 57% of 
Americans who attend religious services weekly believe that “homosexuality should be 
discouraged by society”); News Release, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life & 
The Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Religious Beliefs Underpin 
Opposition to Homosexuality (Nov. 18, 2003), available at http://pewforum.org/docs/ 
index.php?DocID=37 (finding that “those with a high level of religious commitment 
now oppose gay marriage by more than six-to-one”); cf. Pew Research Ctr. for the 
People & the Press & Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Most Still Oppose Gay 
Marriage, but Support for Civil Unions Continues to Rise (Oct. 9, 2009), 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1375/gay-marriage-civil-unions-opinion [hereinafter 
Pew Research Ctr., Most Still Oppose Gay Marriage] (“More than three-quarters of 
white evangelical Protestants (77%) and two-thirds of black Protestants (66%) oppose 
same-sex marriage, as do half of white mainline Protestants (50%).  Catholics are 
evenly divided on the issue, with 45% favoring same-sex marriage and 43% opposing it.  
Most of those unaffiliated with any particular religion support same-sex marriage 
(60%).”).  It is clear that among religiously identified respondents—those who attend 
services more frequently and are presumably more devout—the alignment is starker.  
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Unlike in other industrialized nations—consider the almost 
completely secularized countries of Western Europe—Americans 
continue to exhibit high rates of religious belief, practice, worship 
attendance, and service.22  In addition to the history and continuing 
private practices of citizens, freedom of religion has been legally 
enshrined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;23 it is even 
popularly known to some as America’s “first freedom,” because it is 
the first protection enumerated in the Bill of Rights.24  Despite the 
claim of some that religion, even in America, is undergoing an 
inevitable decline, plenty of evidence suggests otherwise.25 
 
See id. (“Overall, a strong majority of those who attend services at least weekly oppose 
same-sex marriage (71%), while about half of those who seldom or never attend 
religious services favor it (54%). . . . Most regularly attending white Catholics in the 
survey oppose same-sex marriage, while most white Catholics who attend Mass less 
often favor it.  Among white evangelicals, 85% of those who attend services at least 
weekly oppose same-sex marriage, 21 percentage points higher than among less-
observant white evangelicals.”). 
22 See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?  THE CHALLENGES TO 
AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 82 (2005) (arguing that popular uproar over Michael 
Newdow’s lawsuit challenging the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance 
indicates “the extent to which Americans are one of the most religious people in the 
world, particularly compared to the peoples of other highly industrialized 
democracies”).  Huntington also cites statistics that support the common view of 
America’s religiosity:  92% of Americans believe in God, 85% believe that the Bible is 
in some way the word of God, and 63 to 66% of Americans claim membership in a 
church or synagogue.  Id. at 86-87; see also Carolyn A. Deverich, Comment, Establishment 
Clause Jurisprudence and the Free Exercise Dilemma:  A Structural Unitary-Accommodationist 
Argument for the Constitutionality of God in the Public Square, 2006 BYU L. REV. 211, 212 
(citing similar statistics indicating that Americans are relatively religious compared to 
citizens of other industrialized countries). 
23 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
24 See Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2000) (discussing why the First Congress made religious 
freedom the subject of the First Amendment); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 563 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (viewing the Free Exercise Clause’s 
substantive guarantee of liberty as “no less important” than the Free Speech or Takings 
Clauses); PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 17 (1964), quoted in City 
of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 563 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur whole constitutional 
history . . . supports the conclusion that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that 
its recognition may either require or permit preferential treatment on religious 
grounds in some instances . . . .”).  Despite the brevity and deceptive simplicity of the 
First Amendment’s text, the Religion Clauses are some of the most hotly contested 
words in the Constitution, and there is no shortage of secularists who decline to accord 
the Clauses much importance.  See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion 
Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473, 477 (1996) (calling the Free Exercise Clause 
“a limited aberration in a secular state”). 
25 See Michael Novak, The First Institution of Democracy.  Tocqueville on Religion:  What 
Faith Adds to Reason, 6 EUR. VIEW 87, 92 (2007) (arguing with survey data that 
“empirical evidence does not show that religion has lost public salience in recent 
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In addition to the nation’s pervasive religious character, 
Americans have historically conceived of marriage in both law and 
society as a sacred, religious, and pre-political institution that is the 
foundation of society.  In his influential Commentaries on American Law, 
Chancellor James Kent observes that “[t]he primary and most 
important of the domestic relations is that of husband and wife.  It has 
its foundation in nature, and is the only lawful relation by which 
Providence has permitted the continuance of the human race.”26  The 
belief in the power of traditional marriage originated in the United 
States not only through the mostly homogenous Christian beliefs 
about marriage in the late eighteenth century but also because the 
American founders understood “the symbiotic connection between 
family virtues and civic virtues” and believed that traditional marriage 
was a way to sustain the virtue necessary for the smooth running of the 
Republic.27 
Amidst an enduringly religious population and against such a 
deeply rooted institution as traditional marriage, common sense 
suggests that the introduction of same-sex marriage into American law 
would represent anything but a seamless transition.  Contrary to that 
supposition, same-sex marriage proponents—even some of the state 
courts responsible for constitutionalizing same-sex marriage—are 
optimistic about the ease of transition.  In its majority opinion in In re 
Marriage Cases, the California Supreme Court predicted that 
“affording same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the designation 
of marriage will not impinge upon the religious freedom of any 
religious organization, official, or any other person; no religion will be 
required to change its religious policies or practices with regard to 
same-sex couples.”28  Similarly optimistic, the 2004 Goodridge Court in 
Massachusetts declared, “Our decision in no way limits the rights of 
individuals to refuse to marry persons of the same sex for religious or 
 
times”); Peter Baker, Bush Tells Group He Sees a “Third Awakening,” WASH. POST, Sept. 
13, 2006, at A6 (noting that some “scholars and writers have debated for years whether 
a Third Awakening has been taking place”). 
26 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 74 (3d ed., New York, E.B. 
Clayton & James van Norden 1836). 
27 David F. Forte, The Framers’ Idea of Marriage and Family, in THE MEANING OF 
MARRIAGE:  FAMILY, STATE, MARKET, & MORALS 103 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke 
Elshtain eds., 2006); see also id. at 106 (noting that the Founders’ synthesizing of 
marriage as a political institution and an entity governed by Christian norms “gave the 
institution of marriage and the family more power, authority, and inner strength than 
at any time in [the] history of the West”). 
28 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451-52 (Cal. 2008). 
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any other reasons.  It in no way limits the personal freedom to 
disapprove of, or to encourage others to disapprove of, same-sex 
marriage.”29 
Yet the notion that expanding the definition of marriage to 
include same-sex couples will “not impinge upon” religious freedoms 
is difficult to square with reality on the ground.30  In a world where 
same-sex marriage did not impinge upon religious freedoms, the 
United Methodists who own the pavilion in Ocean Grove would not be 
forced to rent their facility for a same-sex civil commitment ceremony. 
The foundation of this Comment is the belief that the legalization 
and spread of same-sex marriage will indeed have far-reaching and 
profound effects on religious liberty, particularly on the rights of 
many religious institutions that oppose same-sex marriage and wish to 
avoid appearing to endorse such marriage through compelled 
compliance with prospective same-sex antidiscrimination laws.  There 
are a host of areas in which conflict seems likely:  violations of 
antidiscrimination laws in public accommodations, employment, 
housing, education, or charitable services;31 loss of tax-exempt status 
for violating “public policy”;32 and violation of hate-crime laws,33 just to 
name a few.  Absent explicit statutory exemptions for religious 
institutions, the possibility for serious conflict exists.34 
 
29 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 n.29 (Mass. 2003). 
30 Indeed, conflicts in this area abound.  In 2006, Massachusetts prevented 
adoption agencies from declining to place children with same-sex couples, and the 
decision forced the state’s largest such agency, Catholic Charities, to exit the adoption 
business altogether.  See Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 
May 15, 2006, at 17.  Litigation is currently pending in a case regarding a New Mexico 
wedding photographer who faces $6,600 in attorneys’ fees for declining to take 
pictures of a lesbian civil commitment ceremony and in the case of a Christian 
counselor in Georgia who declined to advise a woman in a lesbian relationship and 
referred her to another therapist.  Jacqueline L. Salmon, Faith Groups Increasingly Lose 
Gay Rights Fights, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2009, at A4. 
31 Roger Severino, Or for Poorer?  How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939, 957-58, 964 (2007) (arguing that antidiscrimination 
laws in these areas pose potential threats to religious liberty). 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 88-91. 
33 See infra note 81 (describing the pervasiveness of hate-crime laws referencing 
sexual orientation). 
34 See David Blankenhorn & Jonathan Rauch, A Reconciliation on Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK11 (proposing that Congress grant federal civil union status 
to state same-sex marriages and grant exemptions for religious institutions in states 
with religious-conscience exceptions). 
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Rather than catalog the countless foreseeable legal conflicts 
between same-sex marriage and religion, as others have done,35 this 
Comment seeks to explore in greater depth the seriousness of the 
challenge to religious activity and to assess some potential First 
Amendment defenses with which a confronted religious actor or 
institution could respond, paying particular attention to the likeliest 
successful argument:  the right to expressive association. 
Part I discusses why marriage is a fundamentally religious—not 
just social or political—issue on which religious institutions have a 
particularly justifiable desire to advance and protect their theological 
viewpoint.  Part II emphasizes the breadth of religious activity in the 
United States as a prelude to revealing the particular ways in which 
same-sex antidiscrimination laws pose serious challenges to dissenting 
religious institutions; contrary to the position of the state supreme 
courts of California and Massachusetts, the challenge is real and 
pervasive.  Part III briefly examines the Free Exercise Clause from one 
conceptual perspective and concludes in light of recent 
jurisprudence—quite ironically to anyone unfamiliar with Free 
Exercise case law—that a stronger defense for dissenting religious 
institutions likely resides elsewhere.  Finally, Part IV articulates the 
expressive association doctrine of the First Amendment and, through 
application to the pending Ocean Grove case, argues that this doctrine 
provides a more robust defense for religious institutions seeking to 
avoid endorsing same-sex marriage despite the presence of same-sex 
antidiscrimination laws. 
I.  THE RELIGIOUS NATURE OF MARRIAGE 
Religious institutions express substantial concern about marriage 
because of their belief that marriage carries deep theological meaning 
and significance.  Many view marriage not only as a social institution 
in which religious actors play a role but also as an intrinsically 
religious concept in itself.  This theological understanding does not, 
of course, negate the reality that marriage is also a social institution 
regulated by secular authorities.  However, the longstanding and 
widely shared theological view of marriage serves as a necessary 
foundation justifying many religious institutions’ belief that 
 
35 Especially helpful as a catalog of potential areas for legal skirmishes between 
religious actors who oppose same-sex marriage and same-sex marriage proponents is 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, 
Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008). 
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promoting their understanding of marriage constitutes a core tenet of 
their religious mission.36  Appreciating the specifically religious 
character of marriage is important because presumably, under either 
the Free Exercise Clause or the expressive association doctrine, 
religious institutions should have a greater expectation of protection 
for clearly religious—rather than secular or political—beliefs and 
actions.  The dominant religious traditions in the United States today 
all endow marriage with a complex, specifically religious 
conceptualization separate from and in addition to secularly based 
social understandings of marriage.37  The discussion below details this 
religious conceptualization from the Christian perspective, the 
dominant strand of religion in the United States.38 
In the Roman Catholic Church, the largest single religious 
denomination in the United States,39 marriage is understood not just 
as a religious concept but also as a sacrament.  Marriage is one of only 
seven sacraments recognized by the Roman Catholic Church.40  Thus, 
to mark marriage as a sacrament is to place it within a collection of 
 
36 The same-sex marriage controversy does not mark the first time Christians have 
attempted to enforce their own views of marriage against a competing secular 
definition.  Ancient Roman law forbade slaves from marrying unless their unions were 
characterized as concubinage; because the early Church would not tolerate the denial 
of “proper married status” to any Christian, bishops gave slaves special permission to 
marry and kept it secret from the Roman authorities.  See ROSEMARY HAUGHTON, NO. 
23:  THE THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE 41 (Edward Yarnold ed., Fides Publishers Inc. 1971).   
37 As Pope Leo XIII declared in his encyclical Arcanum Divinae Sapientiae, 
Let no one, then, be deceived by the distinction which some civil jurists have 
so strongly insisted upon—the distinction, namely, by virtue of which they 
sever the matrimonial contract from the sacrament . . . . [I]n Christian 
marriage the contract is inseparable from the sacrament . . . for this reason, 
the contract cannot be true and legitimate without being a sacrament as well. 
Pope Leo XII, Encyclical Letter Arcanum Divinae Sapientiae ¶ 23 (Feb. 10, 1880), 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_10 
021880_arcanum_en.html. 
38 For the sake of simplicity and brevity, this Part includes a number of 
generalizations that will pertain to some—I would argue many—but not all Christian 
institutions in the United States.  The nature of this discussion should not obscure the 
variety of views on marriage held by American religious institutions.  See generally Mark 
Strasser, Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions:  On Meaning, Free Exercise, and 
Constitutional Guarantees, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 597, 604-10 (2002) (discussing the 
multiplicity of religious views regarding the permissibility of same-sex marriage). 
39 See, e.g., Richard John Neuhaus, Columnists Say It . . ., FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2, 
2005, http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2005/11/rjn-11205-columnists-say-it 
(noting that, with 66 million members in the United States, Catholicism is the largest 
Christian denomination in the country). 
40 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1210 (2d ed. 1997). 
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the most sacred religious practices of the Church.  The Catechism of 
the Catholic Church describes the sacraments as 
efficacious signs of grace, instituted by Christ and entrusted to the 
Church, by which divine life is dispensed to us.  The visible rites by which 
the sacraments are celebrated signify and make present the graces 
proper to each sacrament.  They bear fruit in those who receive them 
with the required dispositions.
41
 
Thus, according to the Catholic Church, sacraments are divine in 
origin and are the primary means by which believers receive spiritual 
nourishment from God through the Church.  The six other 
sacraments are Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance and 
Reconciliation, the Anointing of the Sick, and Holy Orders.42  
Considering this list, which includes the beginning, end, and weekly 
rituals of a Christian’s life, marriage is included among the most 
important religious marks of Christian life.  It is also noteworthy that 
this list contains purely religious concepts, not moral, social, or 
political concepts derived from religion. 
For Protestants, although marriage is not deemed a sacrament, it 
is nonetheless proclaimed as an important and distinctly religious 
concept, frequently described as a covenant.43  Mainly for historical 
reasons stemming from perceived Roman Catholic abuses that 
precipitated the Protestant Reformation, Protestants retain a belief in 
the religious significance of marriage as an important part of religious 
life without identifying it as a sacrament as Roman Catholics do.44  
Nonetheless, Protestants have esteemed marriage as equally important 
in content and imbued with distinct religious significance.  Many 
Protestant churches describe marriage as a covenant—a deeply 
religious term permeated with biblical significance—that churches 
believe is “a God-willed, holy, and sanctifying vocation.”45 
 
41 Id. § 1131. 
42 Id. § 1210. 
43 See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. BROUWER, BEYOND “I DO”:  WHAT CHRISTIANS BELIEVE 
ABOUT MARRIAGE 21-23 (2001) (describing a covenant as an unbreakable, enduring 
bond possessing religious significance). 
44 Appealing to scriptural authority rather than tradition or Catholic Church 
authority, Protestants limited the sacraments they recognized to two:  baptism and 
communion.  In doing so, they did not necessarily demean the religious significance of 
concepts not designated as sacraments.  Two of the hallmarks of Protestantism are 
preaching and Bible study, yet neither is a sacrament. 
45 Michael G. Lawler, Marriage, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO CHRISTIAN 
THOUGHT 410 (Adrian Hastings et al. eds., 2000). 
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Although they have different labels for it, almost all Christian 
churches share a similar theological view of the religious significance 
and particular importance of marriage.  Contrary to some popular 
perceptions, the Christian theological interpretation of marriage is 
richer and more sophisticated than merely supporting a particular 
view on sexual ethics or a beneficial way of life.46  Rather, as the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church explains, “The marriage covenant, 
by which a man and a woman form with each other an intimate 
communion of life and love, has been founded and endowed with its 
own special laws by the Creator.”47 
Christian theology views the institution of marriage as a divinely 
granted order that has existed since the very creation of humanity 
itself.  The account of creation in the Book of Genesis indicates that 
God intended marriage as a necessary and proper relationship 
between men and women.48  Because this recognition of marriage is 
tied textually to Christian beliefs about the origins of humanity, the 
institution of marriage also signifies broader theological views about 
humanity itself.49  This includes, for example, belief in the intrinsic 
equality between men and women:  humanity as the image of God is 
not complete until the expression of male and female unity is 
achieved.50 
Marriage also holds significance for Christians as a symbol of 
God’s redemption of and continued unity with humanity.  The 
Hebrew prophetic literature conceives of marriage as a symbol of the 
 
46 One commentator describes the mischaracterization as follows: 
There is a not uncommon assumption to the effect that Christian marriage is 
essentially ethical marriage, that is, that a couple have a Christian marriage if 
they live together with at least a minimum level of respect, love, and 
decency. . . . But if Christianity is no more than that, there is no such thing as 
the Christian religion. 
HENRY A. BOWMAN, A CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF MARRIAGE 19 (1959). 
47 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 1660. 
48 See Genesis 2:18 (quoting God as saying, “It is not good that the man should be 
alone; I will make him a helper as his partner”); Id. 2:24 (“Therefore a man leaves his 
father and his mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh.”). 
49 See JOHN L. THOMAS, THE CATHOLIC VIEWPOINT ON MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 
56 (John J. Delaney ed., rev. ed., Image Books 1965) (1958) (“Catholic teaching on 
marriage and the family must be viewed within this wider context, embodying a 
concept of the Church’s mission, the nature of man, and the nature of grace.”). 
50 See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, A THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE 14-15 (1967) (“Man, 
complete and whole, is not created until male and female come together in a union of 
one flesh which makes them a whole being. . . . [A person] makes himself fully human 
by finding in his spouse the remedy for his own inadequacies as a male or female.”). 
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unbreakable covenant between God and God’s people, Israel.51  
Bolstered by a similar understanding based on New Testament 
scripture, “Christian matrimony [signifies] a great supernatural reality 
(union of Christ and the Church).”52  To religious institutions, these 
theological bonds between Christ and the Church and between God 
and Israel are theological expressions of the permanent, covenantal 
unity between God and God’s people as well as an expression of love.  
As a result, many view marriage analogously as a relationship 
connected to God that is covenantal, permanent, and an ultimate 
expression of love.53  Pope John Paul II even describes marriage as “a 
real symbol of the event of salvation.”54 
Finally, the theological view regarding the purposes of marriage 
provides another important indication of marriage’s specifically 
 
51 See Lawler, supra note 45, at 410 (“The root of Christian ideas about the 
sacramentality of marriage goes back to the prophet Hosea’s enthronement of 
marriage as a prophetic symbol of the covenant between God and Israel.”). 
52 OUR SUNDAY VISITOR’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLIC DOCTRINE 414 (Russell 
Shaw ed., 1997). 
53 Lawler supports the idea that marriage is analogous to and revelatory of  
God’s love: 
The conscious presence of Christ, that is, of grace in its most ancient Christian 
meaning, is not something extrinsic to Christian marriage.  It is something 
essential to it, something without which it would not be Christian at all.  
Christian marriage reveals the love of the spouses for one another; but, in the 
image of their love, it also reveals the love of God and of God’s Christ for 
them.  It is in this sense also that, in the Catholic tradition, it is said to be a 
sacrament of the presence of Christ and of the God he reveals. 
Lawler, supra note 45, at 410.  Other commentators describe an even deeper 
connection between God and marriage:  
Christian marriage . . . has a real, essential, and intrinsic reference to the 
mystery of Christ’s union with His Church.  It is rooted in this mystery and is 
organically connected with it, and so partakes of its nature and mysterious 
character.  Christian marriage is not simply a symbol of this mystery or a type 
that lies outside it, but an image of it growing out of the union of Christ with 
the Church, an image based upon this union and pervaded by it.  For it not 
only symbolizes the mystery but really represents it.  It represents the mystery 
because the mystery proves active and operative in it. 
MATTHIAS J. SCHEEBEN, MYSTERIES OF CHRISTIANITY 601-02 (1946).  The symbol of the 
universal Church and Christ united as a bride and groom is a central analogy in 
Christian theology and pervades the New Testament.  See, e.g., John 3:28-29; Matthew 
9:14-15; Ephesians 5:31-33; Revelation 19:6-9. 
54 Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris Consortio § 13 (Nov. 22, 
1981), http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/docume 
nts/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_familiaris-consortio_en.html (describing marriage as “a 
typically Christian communion of two persons because it represents the mystery of 
Christ’s incarnation and the mystery of His covenant”). 
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religious character.  In addition to being a state intrinsically “ordered 
toward the good of the spouses,”55 Christian theology has traditionally 
affirmed the purposes of marriage as directed towards procreation 
and education.  First, according to Christian theology, marriage is the 
ideal context in which human reproduction occurs, a process in which 
husband and wife affirm their place as a reflection of the image of 
God by undertaking a traditionally exclusive action of divinity:  
creation.56  Second, marriage and the development of families are the 
central bases outside the Church itself for teaching the Christian 
faith.57 
This discussion of the specifically religious character of marriage 
is important because it illustrates the extent to which religious 
institutions hold a particularly religious belief in marriage that—at 
least theoretically—should receive more constitutional protection 
than a nonreligious belief.  Imagine a spectrum of subjects on which a 
religious institution could hold a belief, with purely religious concepts 
at one end and purely secular concepts at the other end.  Marriage, as 
the above discussion shows, falls much closer to the religious end than 
to the secular.  A religious institution might also hold a belief or 
preference regarding a purely secular issue—for example, whether 
trigger locks should be required for gun owners.  But while a religious 
group may hold this secular policy position as a result of religious 
principles, the position is attenuated from the institution’s central 
 
55 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 1601.  Bolstering the 
link between theological arguments and real-world impact, empirical research suggests 
a link between greater religious commitment and stronger marriages.  See, e.g., Kieran 
T. Sullivan, Understanding the Relationship Between Religiosity and Marriage:  An 
Investigation of the Immediate and Longitudinal Effects of Religiosity on Newlywed Couples, J. 
FAM. PSYCHOL. 610, 617 (2001) (finding that more religious husbands and wives 
exhibited stronger feelings of aversion to divorce and a greater willingness to seek help 
to preserve the marriage). 
56 See BOWMAN, supra note 46, at 22 (“The couple’s bodies will permit them to 
establish a sexual, a procreative relationship.  Their God-centered orientation will 
permit them to establish a spiritual, a creative relationship.”); cf. Pope Pius XI, 
Encyclical Letter Casti Connubii (Dec. 31, 1930) ¶ 80, http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/index.htm (describing marriage as “the means of 
transmitting life, thus making the parents the ministers, as it were, of the Divine 
Omnipotence”). 
57 See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS 
[DECLARATION ON CHRISTIAN EDUCATION] art. 3 (1965), http://www.vatican.va 
/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/index.htm (noting that it is “particularly in 
the Christian family, enriched by the grace and the office of the sacrament of 
matrimony, that children should be taught from their early years to have a knowledge 
of God according to the faith received in Baptism, to worship Him, and to love their 
neighbor”). 
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expertise in and concern for religious matters.  It is also less likely that 
the group’s religious identity would turn on the viewpoint it offered 
on such a purely secular question.  Marriage, however, is different—at 
least for many religious institutions—precisely because it is an 
independent, even central, religious concept that can connect directly 
to the institution’s religious identity.  Religious institutions should be 
able to expect, at least presumptively, that the government may not 
constitutionally bar them from expressing their religious beliefs or 
identity. 
II.  THE CHALLENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE  
TO LEGITIMATE RELIGIOUS DISSENT 
Despite reassuring words by recent state supreme court decisions 
addressing same-sex marriage and dismissing the potential danger, 
the growing movement for same-sex marriage poses a legitimate and 
serious threat to the conscientious beliefs of many religious 
institutions.  Were religion purely a private and individual matter, as 
some commentators and courts have presumed, perhaps the conflict 
would be less ominous than it is.58  But while it would be convenient to 
cabin religious activity to a narrow and identifiable realm to minimize 
the conflict between religion and an increasingly large and invasive 
bureaucratic state, this categorization belies the theological beliefs 
and practices of many religious institutions. 
As religious actors attempt to operate consistently with their 
religious principles, both in public and in private, they will confront 
some state or federal laws that will seek to enforce competing but, in 
the government’s eyes, equally legitimate goals.  The sweeping 
changes to the definition of marriage wrought by recent and 
increasingly frequent state supreme court decisions like Goodridge, In 
 
58 Justice Scalia has put the problem this way:  
Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if religion were, as the 
Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal avocation that can be 
indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one’s room.  
For most believers it is not that, and has never been.  Religious men and 
women of almost all denominations have felt it necessary to acknowledge and 
beseech the blessing of God as a people, and not just as individuals . . . . 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Mary Ann 
Glendon, Individualism and Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal Systems:  Tensions 
and Accommodations, 1993 BYU L. REV. 385, 408 (noting that the Supreme Court has 
“repeatedly characterized [religion] . . . as a purely private individual experience” and 
that the Court has “ignored the fact that for many individuals religious freedom has 
important associational and institutional aspects”). 
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re Marriage Cases, and Conaway v. Deane,59 have given same-sex marriage 
supporters well-justified hope that the likely irreversible train of same-
sex marriage has already left—or will soon leave—the station.  
Because marriage serves as a foundational part of the United States’ 
social structure, changes to marriage law will necessarily implicate 
actors and institutions in a wide variety of contexts throughout society.  
Given how “deeply intertwined” religious institutions are with the 
celebration of and belief in marriage, religious institutions will face a 
disproportionately large burden when marriage laws are 
fundamentally altered.60 
A.  The Multifaceted Nature of Religious Activity 
How broadly one defines the scope of religious activity and 
identity will shape, in part, the extent of the threat posed by same-sex 
marriage.  How, then, should one understand the nature and extent 
of religious activity?  At one time this question may have been less 
important because sectarian religious activity was not always as suspect 
as it has become today.  While Christianity remains overwhelmingly 
the single largest religious influence, it (and to some extent religion 
in general) may be fading in the United States in favor of 
privatization, pluralism, and secularism.61  As such, society as a whole 
may be less familiar than earlier eras with what, broadly speaking, 
orthodox Christianity teaches about the scope of religious activity.  
Because Christianity is the majority American religion, this Section 
will focus on what Christian theology teaches about the nature of 
religious exercise.  Despite the multiplicity of denominations in the 
United States,62 it is possible to make some generalizations regarding 
what Christian theology teaches about religious activity. 
 
59 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).  
60 See Severino, supra note 31, at 943 (“The specific consequences that will likely 
flow from legalizing same-sex marriage include both government compulsion of 
religious institutions to provide financial or other support for same-sex married 
couples and government withdrawal of public benefits from those institutions that 
oppose same-sex marriage.”). 
61 See generally STEVE BRUCE, GOD IS DEAD:  SECULARIZATION IN THE WEST 20 
(2002) (arguing that “the privatization of religion removes much of the social support 
that is vital to reinforcing beliefs . . . and encourages a de facto relativism that is fatal to 
shared beliefs”). 
62 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174-75 (1965) (noting the great variety 
of belief within religious groups, evidenced by the multiplicity of denominations within 
those groups). 
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First, despite the American preoccupation with individualism and 
autonomy, Christian theology teaches that religion is a corporate 
endeavor.  While it is true that religion is also an association with God 
at the individual level—questions regarding one’s soul are 
ubiquitous—Christianity is viewed as a corporate religion.63  The 
Catechism of the Catholic Church goes so far as to assert, “No one can 
believe alone, just as no one can live alone.”64 
Second, while worship and corporate gatherings are central to 
Christianity, those specific events do not exhaust the definition of 
religious exercise, despite some claims to the contrary.  Some argue 
that one can express the essence, and perhaps the very metes and 
bounds of religious exercise, via a short list of activities connected to 
religious ceremony, ritual, and proselytizing.65  For those desiring to 
limit the scope of authentic religious expression and exercise, this 
definition is advantageous because it largely confines religious activity 
to the sanctuary.  However, as Harold J. Berman, renowned Harvard 
Law professor and expert on the relationship of Christianity and the 
rise of Western law, has explained, religion “is not only a set of 
doctrines and exercises; it is people manifesting a collective concern 
for the ultimate meaning and purpose of life—it is a shared intuition 
of and commitment to transcendent values.”66  Thus, while it is easy to 
admit that worship and sacraments are central components of 
religious exercise, one understands the complete picture only by 
considering the ends of worship and the sacraments. 
Christian worship in its different forms has slightly different 
emphases.  Broadly speaking, Catholic and Episcopal traditions focus 
more on the liturgical and sacramental acts of worship, while for many 
in Protestant traditions the sermon or interpretation and teaching of 
Scripture receives the greater emphasis.  Each, however, imparts great 
significance not only to the worship acts of adoration, prayer, and 
 
63 Describing the vocation of humanity, the Catechism states, “This vocation takes 
a personal form since each of us is called to enter into the divine beatitude; it also 
concerns the human community as a whole.”  CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 
supra note 40, § 1877; see also JOHN H. LEITH, BASIC CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 234 (1993) 
(“To be a Christian and to be the church are one and the same existence.”). 
64 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 166. 
65 See, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 
253, 273 (3d Cir. 2007) (listing potentially covered acts as “assembling with others for a 
worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, 
[and] abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation” (quoting 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990))). 
66 HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 24 (1974). 
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bearing witness to the mysteries of faith through Word and sacrament, 
but to how the act of worship empowers and teaches the individual to 
be fit to serve God and neighbor in the world.  The Roman Catholic 
Catechism explains that the purpose of worship is “so that the faithful 
may live from it and bear witness to it in the world.”67  Indeed, the 
“sacred liturgy does not exhaust the entire activity of the Church.”68  
For Protestants, the statement of the Great Ends of the Church by the 
Presbyterian Church (USA) provides a pertinent summary of the 
nature and ends of religious exercise, and only two of the six items 
mentioned directly involve worship.69 
The Presbyterian Church’s statement of the overarching ends of 
the Church include, in addition to worship, fellowship, the 
preservation of truth, the promotion of social righteousness, and the 
exhibition of the Kingdom of Heaven to the world.70  Two important 
points emerge from this exposition.  First, religious activity is 
necessarily concerned with service and advocacy that attempt to shape 
the social order of the world.  Second, the Church’s mission includes 
a solemn commitment to maintain, develop, and defend certain ideas 
and arguments—the preservation of truth—both inside and outside 
the Church.  Religion is, then, much more than ceremony and is 
necessarily both a private and a public undertaking.  Religious activity 
deals intimately not just with private belief and actions, but also with 
actions that are often public and representative of corporate beliefs.  
The Presbyterian Church (USA) affirms that one of the key tenets of 
the Reformed Protestant tradition is to “work for the transformation 
of society.”71  This is necessarily public work, and its truth did not 
escape famed nineteenth-century French visitor to the United States 
Alexis de Tocqueville, who observed for this reason that religion is 
America’s “first political institution.”72 
 
67 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 1068. 
68 Id. § 1072 (quoting SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, SACROSANCTUM 
CONCILIUM [CONSTITUTION ON THE SACRED LITURGY] art. 9 (1963), 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/index.htm). 
69 The “proclamation of the gospel for the salvation of humankind” and “the 
maintenance of divine worship” are the two ends that directly involve worship.  THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.) PART II:  BOOK OF ORDER, 
2009–2011 § G-1.0200 (2009). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. § G-2.0500. 
72 See Novak, supra note 25, at 92 (explaining the visible and often highly political 
nature of religion in early America). 
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Even if religious activity is broad, it is not all-encompassing.  
Christianity, like most religions, necessarily pertains to ultimate 
concerns about how adherents should live.  With such all-
encompassing categories as these, it is possible to conceive of a 
limitless concept of religious activity.  Towards this end, for example, 
theologian Martin Luther challenged the Roman Catholic notion of 
religious vocations by arguing that a Christian had a religious vocation 
in whatever profession he or she engaged—even if it were sweeping 
floors—because of the Christian’s identity as a Christian rather than 
any one particular career choice.73  That said, traditional Christian 
theology recognizes that secular authorities exist in the world and, 
derivatively, that some activities fall outside the scope of what could be 
defined as religious activity.74 
To help determine what exactly counts as religious activity, 
consider again the spectrum discussed above.75  When a religious 
institution’s belief or activity pertains specifically to a theological 
matter or religious practice, the religious institution may more easily 
argue that its activity is religious.  For purely secular matters that 
contain no direct religious component, the religious institution will be 
less able to argue that its belief or activity is religious.  If, as argued in 
Part I, marriage is a religious concern, then a religious institution’s 
beliefs and actions with respect to marriage should presumably be 
considered “religious activity.” 
B.  Challenges to Religious Institutions Opposed to Same-Sex Marriage 
Religious institutions that support traditional marriage will likely 
face serious legal challenges and catch-22 situations should they 
choose to support traditional marriage in opposition to constitutional 
or statutory rights for same-sex marriage.  Nonetheless, in its 2008 
decision constitutionalizing same-sex marriage, the California Supreme 
Court argued, “[A]ffording same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain 
the designation of marriage will not impinge upon the religious 
freedom of any religious organization, official, or any other person; no 
 
73 MARTIN MARTY, MARTIN LUTHER:  A LIFE 104 (2008) (“Luther . . . made a 
distinction between the honored way that one lives out a calling in the professions, 
jobs, tasks, and roles here below on earth and the also honored way that the same 
person receives a calling from God through the grace which relates to life above in 
heaven.”). 
74 See Matthew 22:21 (“Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and 
to God the things that are God’s.”). 
75 See supra Part I. 
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religion will be required to change its religious policies or practices with 
regard to same-sex couples . . . .”76  Against the easy dismissals of the 
California and Massachusetts Supreme Courts, Roger Severino of the 
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty (an interfaith public interest law 
firm that promotes religious expression) notes four reasons why the 
conflict between same-sex marriage and religious liberty is inevitable. 
First, marriage, as a uniform concept, pervades the law; second, 
religious institutions are regulated, both directly and indirectly, by 
laws that turn on the definition of marriage; third, religion has an 
historically public relationship with marriage that resists radical 
change as a deep matter of conscience; and fourth, same-sex marriage 
proponents are similarly resistant to compromise since many believe, 
in line with the Goodridge concurrence, that “[s]imple principles of 
decency dictate that we extend to [same-sex couples], and to their 
new status, full acceptance, tolerance, and respect.”77 
The particular concern of this Comment is whether religious 
institutions may successfully oppose same-sex marriage and avoid the 
appearance of endorsement that compelled compliance with 
prospective antidiscrimination laws would bring.  If state or federal 
governments fail to provide any religious exemptions for same-sex 
antidiscrimination laws, religious institutions that wish to avoid 
liability under those laws will require a constitutional defense. 
Concretely, one recent source of danger to the religious activity of 
traditional marriage proponents is the increasingly expansive 
conception given to public accommodation law as a vehicle for 
reaching private actors like religious institutions.  As they stand today, 
the public accommodation provisions of federal law contain no 
specific religious exemptions.78  The particular law at issue in the 
Ocean Grove case provides an excellent example of the type of statute 
 
76 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451-52 (Cal. 2008). 
77 Severino, supra note 31, at 942 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 973 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring)); cf. 
Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty and the Liberty of 
Conscience:  A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82 OR. L. REV. 625, 629 (2003) 
(“Conflicts due to laws burdening religious conduct present the most controversial and 
difficult free exercise questions since there are many laws designed to regulate the 
health, safety, and welfare of society that unintentionally burden religiously motivated 
conduct.”). 
78 Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 1 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell 
Wilson eds., 2008) (discussing the coverage of the public accommodations provisions 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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religious organizations could face.  The New Jersey law states in 
relevant part that 
[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to 
obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of 
any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination because 
of . . . marital status, [or] affectional or sexual orientation . . . subject 
only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons.  This 
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
79
 
Additional troubling areas for religious institutions could include 
violations of antidiscrimination laws in employment, housing, 
education, or charitable services simply for following their conscience 
or theology with respect to same-sex marriage.80  There is even the 
prospect of “hate speech” laws that could prevent or at least chill an 
organization from expressing even rationally grounded natural law 
arguments or widely shared theological arguments against same-sex 
marriage.81  It is true that the prospect of clergy being compelled 
personally to perform same-sex marriage ceremonies is not now a 
cognizable threat.  Nonetheless, religious actors and institutions do 
face both potential lawsuits and the prospect of losing tax-exempt 
status or other government privileges as a result of their advocacy 
against same-sex marriage or their desire to avoid the appearance of 
its endorsement by forced association with the practice (such as 
 
79 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -5 (West 2002).  The New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of New Jersey’s public accommodation law provides more substantial 
coverage than similar laws in other states.  See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 
663 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
80 See Severino, supra note 31, at 957-58 (“[A]ntidiscrimination regulations that 
would attend the widespread recognition of same-sex marriage threaten to erode the 
traditional deference to religious sensibilities, thus creating traction for . . . lawsuits.”).  
81 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty observed, in a 2007 amicus brief, that 
“[g]eneral hate-crime statutes exist in at least 45 states.  Of those, currently 32 
states . . . have hate-crime laws referencing sexual orientation. . . . Some states have 
already taken the next step and banned sexual-orientation related hate speech directly, 
as in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.”  Brief [of] Amicus Curiae the Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty in Support of Defendant at 8-9, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 
(Iowa 2009) (No. 5965).  Specifically, in 2004, Christians who were peaceably 
protesting were arrested on public property at a Philadelphia gay pride event for 
“ethnic intimidation” under hate crimes laws.  See Startzell v. City of Phila., No. 05-
05287, 2007 WL 172400, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2007).  Also consider the church that 
offered a series of discussions regarding the theological case against homosexuality 
after it discovered that its youth minister had participated in a civil commitment 
ceremony with her lesbian partner; the youth minister sued the church for its religious 
speech.  See Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 651-53 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming the dismissal of the youth minister’s case). 
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through the forced renting of a church banquet hall for a same-sex 
wedding reception). 
At the constitutional level, the fact that each of the landmark state 
supreme court decisions has so far been confined to the respective 
state’s boundaries should provide little comfort to religious 
institutions supporting traditional marriage.  Same-sex marriage 
proponents envision a day when the Full Faith and Credit Clause82 will 
be used to recognize, in a state prohibiting same-sex marriage, a same-
sex marriage validly entered into in a state allowing such marriage.83  
This possibility remains real despite the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA)84 and the fact that thirty-nine states have passed state 
versions of DOMA or its equivalent.85  Although some scholars have 
argued persuasively against it,86 there is reason to suspect that, after 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas struck 
down Texas’s anti-sodomy law, DOMA faces a serious threat of being 
ruled unconstitutional.87 
 
82 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”). 
83 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the 
Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 35-36 (2005) (arguing that the Full Faith 
and Credit clause should be interpreted to require interstate recognition of valid 
Massachusetts same-sex marriages). 
84 DOMA is comprised of two important provisions.  First, with respect to federal 
laws and regulations, “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man 
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of 
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).  Second, the law 
provides that “[n]o State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of 
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1738C (2006). 
85 See Alliance Defense Fund, DOMA Watch Home Page, http://www.doma 
watch.org/index.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2009) (“37 states have their own Defense of 
Marriage Acts (DOMAs), while 2 more states have strong language that defines 
marriage as one man and one woman.”). 
86 See, e.g., Randy Beck, The City of God and the Cities of Men:  A Response to Jason 
Carter, 41 GA. L. REV. 113, 150 (2006) (concluding that Lawrence v. Texas does not 
imply a “constitutional right to same-sex marriage”). 
87 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s 
opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction 
to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal 
recognition in marriage is concerned.”); see also Severino, supra note 31, at 957 
(“Anyone seeking to strike down DOMA and establish same-sex marriage nationwide 
will find plenty of ammunition in Lawrence.”). 
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The Bob Jones decision should also give religious institutions pause 
in the event that public opinion polls slide decisively toward 
permitting same-sex marriage.  In Bob Jones University v. United States, 
the United States Supreme Court held that a private, Christian 
fundamentalist university must lose its tax-exempt status or forfeit its 
religiously based policy of denying admission to applicants engaged in 
an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or 
dating.88  The Court based its decision in part on IRS Revenue Ruling 
71-447,89 which embraces the common law definition of “charity.”  
Under § 170 and § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, tax 
exempt organizations must not engage in activity contrary to settled 
“public policy.”90  Given Bob Jones, if same-sex marriage becomes even 
more widespread and accepted throughout society, dissenting 
religious organizations could lose their tax-exempt status for adhering 
to their religious beliefs about marriage.91  Regardless of one’s beliefs 
about the substantive merits of any particular public policy-based 
restriction via Bob Jones, religious institutions should be wary of 
effectively losing their advocacy rights through this back door. 
While recent polling data continues to suggest that a majority of 
Americans disapprove of same-sex marriage, the margin has 
diminished.92  Furthermore, support for acceptance of homosexuality 
generally, and thus for allowing civil unions or other benefits short of 
marriage to same-sex couples, has risen.93  The demographic most 
likely to support gay rights is the young.94  If this fact foretells a 
generational change of attitude towards homosexuality, instead of 
merely a belief that most young people outgrow over time, religious 
 
88 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
89 Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. 
90 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585, 591-92. 
91 Conceivably, courts could also simply rule that infringement of an 
antidiscrimination statute violates “public policy” by definition. 
92 Charles Franklin, Gay Marriage Support and Opposition, POLLSTER.COM, May 21, 
2008, http://www.pollster.com/blogs/gay_marriage_support_and_oppos.php (“The 
net effect of some 16 years of public debate was a 10 point decline in opposition and a 
12 point rise in support.”).   
93 Id. (“When the ‘civil unions’ option is added, opposition to gay rights drops 
significantly from about 55% to 40%.  Likewise, support for gay marriage drops from 
40% to 29%.”); see also Pew Research Ctr., Most Still Oppose Gay Marriage, supra note 
21 (“Over the past year, support for civil unions has grown significantly among those 
who oppose same-sex marriage (from 24% in August 2008 to 30% in 2009) while 
remaining stable among those who favor same-sex marriage.”). 
94 See Leslie Fulbright, Voters Still Split on Same-Sex Marriage, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 10, 
2009, at B1 (“Voters aged 18 to 39 favor gay marriage by 55 percent while those 65 or 
older are 58 percent opposed, according to the poll.”). 
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institutions have even more cause for concern.  None of this is to say 
that religious actors and institutions have a right to have others agree 
with them or that public mores and policies cannot change.  Yet all of 
these data are relevant because judicial history in dealing with 
similarly divisive social issues has demonstrated the reliance of courts 
on public opinion polls.95  Even if a significant minority of religious 
actors maintains traditional beliefs on same-sex marriage, as those 
beliefs become more unpopular, religious institutions’ ability to 
exercise those beliefs publicly will become much more difficult, even 
if theoretically they should be protected under the First 
Amendment.96 
For religious institutions with limited budgets that may be averse 
to litigation risk, the advocacy of traditional marriage could be chilled, 
potentially increasing even further the popular support for same-sex 
marriage as fewer organizations make public arguments to oppose it.  
Harmful in a different way, if religious institutions’ silence is 
interpreted as tacit support for, or indifference to, same-sex marriage, 
religious institutions could send an unintended message.  If the public 
sees religious institutions such as the Methodist pavilion owners 
allowing same-sex civil commitment ceremonies on their premises, 
casual observers may erroneously think the Methodist church has 
changed its historic stance against same-sex marriage.  Likewise, if a 
church is reluctant to publicly make the case against same-sex 
marriage out of fear of facing an expensive and distracting lawsuit or 
fear of losing tax-exempt status, it may decide simply to avoid the issue 
instead.  Given the general dearth of reasoned arguments against 
same-sex marriage in academia, the media, and the entertainment 
industry, should religious actors and institutions be misperceived or 
unfairly quieted, the public would lose one of the most important 
 
95 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (noting as part of the argument 
for overturning Bowers “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to 
sex”(emphasis added)); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 699 (2000) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“Over the years, however, interaction with real people, rather than 
mere adherence to traditional ways of thinking about members of unfamiliar classes, 
have modified those opinions [regarding homosexuality].”); see also Robert A. Dahl, 
Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a National Policy-maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 
279, 291-93 (1957) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court rarely “plant[s] itself 
firmly against a lawmaking majority” by holding federal legislation unconstitutional). 
96 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983) (revoking the 
tax-exempt status of a religious university that banned interracial dating and marriage 
as part of its admissions policy, even though the policy stemmed directly from sincerely 
held religious beliefs). 
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sources of debate and discussion on this social controversy.  With 
religious actors thus diminished in their power to make public 
arguments or statements, one should not be surprised that public 
opinion on same-sex marriage would become more permissive. 
Similarly, Harvard Law professor and former United States 
ambassador to the Holy See, Mary Ann Glendon, has argued that 
same-sex marriage is dangerous for religious institutions supporting 
traditional marriage because, once legal, opponents of same-sex 
marriage will be treated as pariahs, and a form of reverse 
discrimination will occur.  Glendon writes, 
As much as one may wish to live and let live, the experience in other 
countries reveals that once these arrangements become law, there will be 
no live-and-let-live policy for those who differ.  Gay-marriage proponents 
use the language of openness, tolerance and diversity, yet one 
foreseeable effect of their success will be to usher in an era of 
intolerance and discrimination the likes of which we have rarely seen 
before.  Every person and every religion that disagrees will be labeled as 
bigoted and openly discriminated against.  The ax will fall most heavily on 
religious persons and groups that don’t go along.  Religious institutions 
will be hit with lawsuits if they refuse to compromise their principles.
97
 
Regarding scenarios exactly like this, the late Father John Neuhaus, 
one of Time’s 100 most influential public intellectuals, often quipped 
(but only half in jest) that where orthodoxy becomes optional, 
orthodoxy will sooner or later be proscribed.98 
III.  THE FREE EXERCISE DEFENSE 
The purview of this Comment is not to provide an exhaustive 
analysis of the Free Exercise Clause.  Given the varied interpretations 
the Clause has received in the past, however, it is worth investigating 
 
97 Mary Ann Glendon, For Better or for Worse?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at A14; see 
also Mark Galli, Is the Gay Marriage Debate Over?  What the Battle for Traditional Marriage 
Means for Americans—and Evangelicals, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, July 2009, at 31 (“A recent 
poll of Massachusetts residents revealed that 36 percent of voters who oppose gay 
marriage agreed with the statement, ‘If you speak out against gay marriage in 
Massachusetts you really have to watch your back because some people may try to 
hurt you.’”). 
98 Victor Morton & Julia Duin, Faith Community Mourns ‘Inspirational’ Neuhaus:  
Catholic Leader, 72, Dies from Cancer, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 
WLNR 465436; see also Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Jan. 24, 
1774) (describing the “diabolical, hell-conceived principle” that allowed “five or six 
well-meaning men [being imprisoned] in close jail for publishing their religious 
sentiments, which in the main are very orthodox”), in 1 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 
1769–1783, at 18, 21 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900). 
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whether the Clause could assist religious institutions as a defense 
against same-sex antidiscrimination laws.  First, does the text and 
intent of the Free Exercise Clause provide support for a defense of 
religious institutions promoting traditional marriage?  Second, how 
does the Supreme Court’s contemporary free exercise jurisprudence 
treat these types of cases?  Despite a compelling argument that the 
text and intent of the Free Exercise Clause could be understood to 
provide a defense for religious institutions on an issue like marriage, 
the Court’s new line of jurisprudence, begun in Employment Division v. 
Smith,99 regarding neutral, generally applicable laws, casts doubt upon 
the success of such an argument without a marked change in the 
Court’s analysis. 
A.  One View of the Text and Intent of the Free Exercise Clause 
Although competing theories exist, it is at least plausible that the 
text and intent of the Free Exercise Clause should provide religious 
institutions meaningful protection for their beliefs and actions with 
respect to marriage.  While it is the text of the amendment—not the 
history or the intentions of the drafters—that is constitutional law, in 
order to respect the reality that the government is guided by a written 
constitution, it is both necessary and instructive to consider seriously 
the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause as it was understood 
when ratified.100  As the Court has observed, “No provision of the 
Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating 
history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.”101  Finally, 
at the outset, it is worth noting the obvious:  the Free Exercise Clause 
is an explicit constitutional provision in which the framers chose to 
protect “religion” rather than similar or similarly important 
categories.102  This point may be relevant for same-sex marriage 
antidiscrimination statutes in as-applied challenges by religious 
institutions; the United States Supreme Court has long held that more 
 
99 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
exempt religious actors from duties imposed by neutral and generally applicable laws). 
100 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL:  RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 11-15 (1986) 
(arguing that it is appropriate to use history in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause).   
101 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
102 Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1034 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[I]t is crucial to 
realize that the free exercise clause does not protect all deeply held beliefs, however 
‘ultimate’ their ends or all-consuming their means.”). 
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stringent scrutiny applies to statutes that fall under specific textual 
prohibitions of the Bill of Rights.103 
The Religion Clauses read, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”104  Distinct from other constitutional amendments, 
the First Amendment is a negative right, today preventing both the 
federal and state governments from enacting certain types of laws, 
rather than a positive “right, privilege, or immunity.”105  The 
Department of Justice has expressed the view that, as a negative right, 
the text may suggest that the framers viewed the free exercise of 
religion as the type of right that is inalienable rather than as one of 
the “mere civil privileges conferred by a benevolent sovereign.”106 
“Free exercise,” however, is not a crystalline term; the scope of its 
coverage is open to interpretation.  Thus, crucial to understanding 
free exercise is familiarity with the debate about which categories of 
religious activities it protects.107  The classic and perhaps most 
important debate has centered on whether the Free Exercise Clause 
protects both beliefs and actions or only the former.  The proposition 
that the Clause protects the belief and the profession of religious 
doctrine against unfavorable government compulsion, punishment, 
disabilities, or favoritism is widely accepted today.108 
However, the history of the extent to which action was thought to 
be protected is complicated and has vacillated over time.  In his 
famous “wall of separation” letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote, “the legislative powers of government reach 
actions only, and not opinions . . . . [M]an . . . has no natural right in 
 
103 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2008) 
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
[i.e., narrower than that provided by rational-basis review] when legislation appears on 
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first 
ten amendments . . . .” (italics omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting United States 
v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))). 
104 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
105 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 100, at 15.  On the incorporation of the 
Free Exercise Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
106 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 100, at 16. 
107 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1463 (2d ed. 2005) (“The 
Free Exercise Clause . . . obviously does not provide absolute protection for religiously 
motivated conduct.”). 
108 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (indicating a number 
of different prohibitions on government conduct as it relates to religious belief, 
including government’s inability to compel belief affirmation or to punish the 
expression of beliefs it deems false). 
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opposition to his social duties.”109  This opinion of Jefferson’s was the 
basis for the Court’s early ruling that free-exercise exemptions to 
generally applicable laws may apply to opinions but not to actions.110  
However, both before and after Jefferson, commentators and courts 
took a less restrictive view.  William Penn in 1670 understood freedom 
of conscience to include “the exercise of ourselves in a visible way of 
worship,”111 and well-known Virginia judge and professor St. George 
Tucker, a religious moderate, included in an 1803 definition of 
freedom of conscience both religious opinions “and duties.”112 
Consideration of the historic context of religion in the Founding 
period adds further perspective for interpreting the Religion Clauses.  
It is well known that some of the founders, including Thomas 
Jefferson, favored the period’s more philosophical approach to 
religion, deism, but Michael McConnell argues that to place the focus 
there is a mistake.113  Rather, McConnell contends, the existence of a 
widespread and powerful evangelical religious revival provides the 
more determinative historical focal point.114  In an irony often 
underappreciated in history lessons, religious rationalists, to whom 
many attribute the very same deist tendencies suspected by some to 
buttress the Religion Clauses, were the ones that were “far more likely 
than the enthusiastic believers to side with the established church.”115 
 
109 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Comm. of the Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 
1820), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 281, 281-82 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904). 
110 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Laws . . . cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, [but] they may with practices.”). 
111 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1451-52 (1990) (quoting WILLIAM PENN, 
The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience Debated, in 1 A COLLECTION OF THE WORKS OF 
WILLIAM PENN 447 (1726)). 
112 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 96, 97 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); see 
also JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 45 
(2005) (“For most eighteenth-century writers, religious belief and religious action went 
hand in hand, and each deserved legal protection.”). 
113 McConnell, supra note 112, at 1437 (“It is a mistake to read the religion clauses 
under the now prevalent assumption that ‘the governing intellectual climate of the late 
eighteenth century was that of deism (or natural law).’” (quoting William P. Marshall, 
The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 357, 377 (1989))). 
114 Id. (citing a historian who believed that “the Enlightenment world view 
‘excludes many, probably most, people who lived in America in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries’”). 
115 Id. at 1440. 
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On the one hand, representatives of non-established religions—
such as Baptists—took free exercise and disestablishment principles 
very seriously to demand a separation of church and state,116 while it 
was republicans who regarded religion no less seriously but saw it 
more instrumentally as an important guarantor of civic virtue, 
meaning it should be in some way affiliated with, and supported by, 
the state.  McConnell observes, 
The paradox of the religious freedom debates of the late eighteenth 
century is that one side employed essentially secular arguments based on 
the needs of civil society for the support of religion, while the other side 
employed essentially religious arguments based on the primacy of duties 
to God over duties to the state in support of disestablishment and free 
exercise.
117
 
The upshot of this analysis is that it avoids perceiving the 
church/state problem at the Founding as understood predominantly 
in either Lockean terms (preventing religious discord through 
tolerance and making religion irrelevant to political affairs) or in 
republican terms (viewing religion as an instrument that serves the 
state’s interest).  Rather, from the dominant perspective of the 
religious enthusiasts whose political efforts, McConnell claims, most 
helped bring about the First Amendment, the crux of the problem 
was too much state power and interference directed against religious 
freedom.  As such, the proper meaning and scope of protected free 
exercise may very well be determined not by the matters the public or 
state is concerned about but “by [the] matters God is concerned 
about, according to the conscientious belief of the individual.”118  
 
116 The Supreme Court has also noted the historical link between calls for strict 
disestablishment and free exercise.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947) 
(“[I]ndividual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was 
stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to 
interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.”). 
117 McConnell, supra note 111, at 1442. 
118 Id. at 1446; see also WITTE, supra note 112, at 97 (“To read the [F]ree [E]xercise 
[C]lause too minimally is hard to square with the widespread solicitude for rights of 
conscience and free exercise reflected in the First Congress’s debates.”); James 
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (“Before any man can 
be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the 
Governor of the Universe.”), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1783–1787, at 185 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).  Despite Madison’s absolutist disestablishment view of 
church and state presented by Justice Rutledge’s famous dissent in Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. at 28-63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting), in which Rutledge identifies 
Madison as the premier authority on the meaning of the Religion Clauses, Madisonian 
thinking on free exercise was similarly starkly drawn in favor of broad religious 
exercise.  As the discussion herein observes, this seeming inconsistency between strict 
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Given this history, Professor John Witte’s formulation of free exercise 
is apt:  “[T]he right to act publicly on the choices of conscience once 
made—up to the limits of encroaching on the rights of others or the 
general peace of the community.”119  Contrast this view with the 
perspective of modern liberalism, which “tends to protect religious 
freedom only when it does not matter—when it is private and 
inconsequential.”120  At least one important reading of the Free 
Exercise Clause suggests that this latter view is incompatible with the 
intent behind the Religion Clauses.121 
B.  Supreme Court Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
Despite good arguments for a robust interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause based on text, history, and public policy, the Clause in 
practice has not provided as much protection as some religious 
adherents might desire.122  The text of the Free Exercise Clause is brief 
 
disestablishment and robust free exercise is friendly, rather than unfriendly, to 
religion, and is indeed no contradiction at all.  But see Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The 
Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause:  The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1085 (2008) (arguing that the drafters’ notes on the Free 
Exercise Clause shed “almost no light” on its original meaning but that the Clause 
likely did not support conscientious exemptions because when Congress considered 
what would become the Second Amendment, the First Congress “directly considered 
and rejected a constitutional right to religious-based exemption from militia service”).  
This debate played itself out in the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997).  Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and Souter generally agreed with McConnell’s 
interpretation of the history discussed herein, id. at 548-65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), 
and Justices Scalia and Stevens rejected the same history as inconclusive.  Id. at 537-44 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
119 WITTE, supra note 112, at 45. 
120 McConnell, supra note 24, at 1265. 
121 There is also a competing body of academic literature against favoring 
widespread exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause.  See generally MARCI A. 
HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL:  RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005); MICHAEL J. 
MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS:  THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1978); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled:  Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren 
Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991); Philip A. Hamburger, A 
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption:  An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 915 (1992); Philip A. Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835 (2004); Philip B. 
Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution:  The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and 
the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1979); Marshall, supra note 113; Mark Tushnet, 
The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988); 
Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1990); Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in 
Early America:  The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 367 
(1993–94). 
122 Scholars note two broad understandings of the Free Exercise Clause: 
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and open to multiple interpretations, and the history regarding its 
intent and purpose is widely debated; consequently, this area of 
constitutional law is one that is driven by common law.123  This Section 
examines the Court’s position, not on every potential free exercise 
issue, but on a sample of the likely critical issues for religious 
institutions facing same-sex antidiscrimination statutes:  namely, the 
extent to which the Clause covers actions as well as beliefs and how 
the Clause is interpreted as a defense against neutral, generally 
applicable laws. 
Separating religious free exercise into its two components—belief 
and action—the Free Exercise Clause has successfully protected 
religious belief absolutely but provides only qualified protection for 
religiously motivated conduct.124 
The Supreme Court first had occasion for significant treatment of 
the Free Exercise Clause’s protection of beliefs versus actions in 
 
First, one could conceive of the Free Exercise Clause as primarily promoting 
religious autonomy-—facilitating the ability of religious adherents to practice 
their faiths, even when such practice entails violating generally applicable laws 
enacted without religiously discriminatory intent.  The alternative approach 
would conceptualize the Clause in terms of enhancing relative equality among 
and between religious sects. 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels:  Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the 
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2008).  The latter 
reading, of course, provides less support to religious institutions.  One scholar has 
noted the lack of doctrinal development in free exercise and suspects that courts may 
be uncomfortable with combining necessary judicial compromise and eternal truths.  
See Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 504, 506 
(2003) (“Comparing religion clause doctrine to free speech or equal protection 
doctrine today is like comparing a Dick and Jane reading primer to The Brothers 
Karamazov.”). 
123 STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE, at iii (2d ed. 2006) (“Because the 
Court has gone beyond the First Amendment’s text to define the proper limits of the 
relationship between church and state, interpretive issues have always been at the 
forefront of Religion Clause litigation.”). 
124 The Supreme Court discussed the distinction between regulating belief and 
action in the first Smith case: 
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any 
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such . . . . On the other hand, 
the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to 
governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or 
principles, for “even when the action is in accord with one’s religious 
convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.” 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 n.13 (1988) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963)). 
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Reynolds v. United States,125 where the Court held that beliefs are 
protected, but actions are not.126  The case before the Court 
concerned a Mormon’s argument that the Free Exercise Clause 
entitled him to an exemption from a law criminalizing polygamy.  The 
Court cited Thomas Jefferson’s view of the Religion Clauses as the 
nearly authoritative word on the Clauses’ interpretation.127  The effect 
of Jefferson’s and the Court’s reading is that the Free Exercise Clause 
protects an individual’s religious beliefs but fails to protect the 
religious actions that flow from those beliefs.128  At one level, this 
distinction is necessary for government to function.  As the Court in 
Reynolds worried, there would be a point at which—free to act 
according to one’s own religious beliefs regardless of the state’s law—
a person could become “a law unto himself.”129 
Evolving over time from its initial position in Reynolds, the Court 
subsequently upheld the right of religious groups to solicit funds 
under the Free Exercise Clause.130  Without going so far as to protect 
all religious conduct, the Court stated, “In every case the power to 
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, 
unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”131  The Court further 
extended the protection of the Free Exercise Clause in Sherbert v. 
Verner,132 a case involving a claim for unemployment benefits by a 
woman whose religion prevented her from working on Saturdays.  
The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefits and 
argued that “to condition the availability of benefits upon this 
appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious 
faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional 
 
125 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
126 Id. at 145 (“A party’s religious beliefs cannot be accepted as a justification for 
his committing an overt act, made criminal by the law of the land.”). 
127 Id. at 164 (concluding that Jefferson’s view “may be accepted almost as an 
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured”). 
128 Id. (“Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was 
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good 
order.”). 
129 Id. at 167.  Even the Catholic Church recognizes this principle.  CATECHISM OF 
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, § 2109 (“The right to religious liberty can of 
itself be neither unlimited nor limited only by a ‘public order’ conceived in a positivist 
or naturalist manner.”). 
130 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 107, at 1472 (tracing the development of the Court’s 
free exercise jurisprudence). 
131 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). 
132 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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liberties.”133  For a law that infringes upon religious free exercise, strict 
scrutiny was the appropriate test.134 
Then, in 1990, in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith,135 the Court significantly modified its free exercise 
doctrine and addressed both the issue of belief versus action and how 
the Free Exercise Clause applies against neutral, generally applicable 
laws.  Additionally, the Court articulated what remains the current test 
for Free Exercise Clause violations.  Smith involved a challenge to 
Oregon’s criminalization of the drug peyote.  After being denied 
unemployment benefits because they were fired for violating Oregon’s 
controlled substance law, two Native American Church members 
unsuccessfully sought protection under the Free Exercise Clause, 
arguing that they had only used peyote as a ceremonial sacrament.  
The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit 
Oregon’s application of its drug laws to the ceremonial ingestion of 
peyote and that the state could, therefore, deny the men 
unemployment benefits.  The Court, with Justice Scalia writing for the 
majority, held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”136 
Even under the narrow province given to Free Exercise by the 
Court in Smith, contra Jefferson, the Court believed that some room 
exists for protecting religious action.137  Four Justices on the Smith 
Court, however, supported the argument Justice O’Connor made for 
an even more permissive protection for religious conduct, a view that 
may comport more faithfully with the First Amendment’s original 
purposes and context.138  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence139 rested on 
 
133 Id. at 406. 
134 Id. at 403. 
135 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
136 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). 
137 Id. at 877 (“[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and 
profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts:  assembling with 
others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, 
proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation.”).  The 
drawback of the Court’s definition is that it only protects actions that are prohibited 
because they were engaged in for religious reasons or for the religious belief they 
exhibit.  Id. 
138 Because the makeup of the Court has changed since the 5-4 Smith decision, it is 
possible that the Court going forward may fall in line behind Justice O’Connor’s view.  
From the Smith Court, only Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Kennedy remain today (all in 
the Smith majority). 
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a more robust understanding of “exercise,” noting that it includes, 
among other things, permission to engage in “religious observances 
such as acts of public and private worship, preaching, and 
prophesying.”140  Observing the absence of any distinction between 
belief and conduct in the Free Exercise Clause, Justice O’Connor 
concluded that “conduct motivated by sincere religious belief . . . must 
be at least presumptively protected.”141 
This concurrence also resisted the Smith majority’s absolute 
deference to neutral laws of general applicability.142  Instead, the 
O’Connor bloc emphasized that the logical and straightforward 
consequence of a neutral law of general applicability could easily 
accomplish the very end prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause:  
barring the free exercise of religiously motivated conduct.143  The 
result of this restriction, Justice O’Connor argued, is to place would-be 
religious adherents between the Scylla of obeying civil law at the 
expense of divine law and the Charybdis of obeying divine law at the 
expense of civil law.  Striking at the core of what free exercise means, 
Justice O’Connor concluded that 
the essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden imposed by 
government on religious practices or beliefs, whether the burden is 
imposed directly through laws that prohibit or compel specific religious 
practices, or indirectly through laws that, in effect, make abandonment 
of one’s own religion or conformity to the religious beliefs of others the 
price of an equal place in the civil community.
144
 
Justice O’Connor believed it crucial to recognize that in placing 
“substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.”145 
 
139 Justice O’Connor concurred with the majority in judgment, although the 
opinion she wrote and the more permissive view of free exercise she advocated make it 
difficult to explain her vote with the majority. 
140 Smith, 494 U.S. at 893 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 901 (“There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general 
applicability . . . for [such laws] can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience 
or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion.”). 
143 Id. at 893 (“[A] law that prohibits certain conduct--conduct that happens to be 
an act of worship for someone--manifestly does prohibit that person’s free exercise of 
his religion.”). 
144 Id. at 897. 
145 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 
717-18 (1981)). 
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What has the Court’s stance been after Smith?  Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah,146 a case involving ritual animal 
sacrifice, is the only Supreme Court decision so far to interpret and 
apply Smith.147  In this case, a church of the Santeria religion brought 
an action challenging city ordinances prohibiting the sacramental 
slaughter of animals.  The Court held that the city ordinances were 
neither neutral nor generally applicable and that the governmental 
interest allegedly advanced by the ordinances did not justify targeting 
religious activity.148  Thus, the Court affirmed that a free exercise claim 
could survive after Smith for statutes that were not actually neutral and 
generally applicable, but the Lukumi decision did nothing to ease the 
nearly impregnable barrier between a free exercise claim and a statute 
that is neutral and generally applicable. 
C.  Problematic Application to the Ocean Grove Case 
In sum, due to the high barrier erected by the Smith Court against 
free exercise claims challenging neutral, generally applicable laws, 
religious institutions will likely need more than the Free Exercise 
Clause to successfully mount a constitutional defense to same-sex 
antidiscrimination laws.  Most likely, courts would consider the type of 
statute anticipated by this Comment to be neutral and generally 
applicable.  Under the Smith doctrine, therefore, religious institutions 
would not be able to use the Free Exercise Clause as a source of 
constitutional protection for violating, in support of traditional 
marriage, same-sex antidiscrimination laws. 
However, even if it were true that Smith made it significantly more 
difficult to challenge a neutral, generally applicable law on free 
exercise grounds, possible alternatives may exist.  First, religious 
institutions in certain states could potentially avail themselves of the 
compelling interest test via state Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
statutes in making a free exercise defense based on state 
constitutional grounds.149  Likewise, the federal Religious Freedom 
 
146 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
147 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 107, at 1478. 
148 For commentary on both Smith and Lukumi, see Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise 
Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:  Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001). 
149 See Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA:  Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State 
Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 253-62 (1998) (providing several examples of 
strong state protection of free exercise rights); Robert M. O’Neil, Religious Freedom and 
Nondiscrimination:  State RFRA Laws Versus Civil Rights, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785, 792-93 
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Restoration Act remains a valid route for satisfying the compelling 
interest test should a federal same-sex marriage antidiscrimination 
statute arise.150 
Second, the majority opinion in Smith left open the possibility of a 
successful Free Exercise Clause defense when a neutral, generally 
applicable law was challenged on free exercise grounds and an 
additional constitutional ground.151  Whereas the employment 
compensation statute in Smith only implicated free exercise concerns, 
a court could hold a statute unconstitutional in other “hybrid 
situation[s]” that implicate more than one constitutional right.152  In 
discussing the fact that free speech cases often contain an additional 
dose of freedom of religion, the Court commented specifically that “it 
is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of 
association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise 
Clause concerns.”153  As argued in Part IV of this Comment, there is a 
strong expressive association defense in the Ocean Grove case.  Thus, 
even after Smith it is possible that a court could combine a free 
exercise and expressive association claim and receive compelling 
interest review even regarding a neutral, generally applicable 
antidiscrimination law.  Some scholars are optimistic that this “hybrid 
rights” theory could be successful for Free Exercise claims even after 
Smith;154 however, other scholars have offered strong objections to the 
 
(1999) (surveying the issues a state faces if it wishes to pass RFRA laws that provide 
stronger free exercise protection). 
150 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down RFRA on 
federalism grounds only with respect to a state law). 
151 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (“The only decisions in 
which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law . . . have involved . . . the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional provisions . . . .”). 
152 Id. at 882 (“The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a 
free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”). 
153 Id.  Even if it is easy to envision, courts have had difficulty understanding and 
interpreting the hybrid rights doctrine.  See Timothy J. Santoli, Note, A Decade After 
Employment Division v. Smith:  Examining How Courts Are Still Grappling with the Hybrid-
Rights Exception to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
649, 665-67 (2001) (identifying three separate approaches to interpreting Smith’s 
hybrid-rights exception among the circuit courts). 
154 One author agues, for example, that as same-sex marriage gathers increasing 
support from religious groups it may be possible to bring a free exercise claim 
challenging same-sex marriage bans under a hybrid rights theory.  See Ariel Y. Graff, 
Free Exercise and Hybrid Rights:  An Alternative Perspective on the Constitutionality of Same-Sex 
Marriage Bans, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 23, 25 (2006) (arguing that “religious exemptions 
from same-sex marriage bans are required under a hybrid rights analysis”).   
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exception, leaving the doctrine’s utility in question.155  At minimum, 
the hybrid-rights theory could enable a sympathetic lower court to 
evade the Smith doctrine and find a free exercise claim colorable 
enough to warrant heightened scrutiny.156  Because the viability of this 
strategy would turn on the success of an expressive association claim, 
it is to an analysis of that defense that we now turn.157 
IV.  THE EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION DEFENSE 
A.  Doctrinal Overview 
Ironically, despite the explicit textual protection of the free 
exercise of religion in the First Amendment, religious institutions in 
practice often receive greater protection under First Amendment 
doctrines other than the Religion Clauses.158  Another important locus 
of rights for religious entities is the right to freedom of association.159  
While the First Amendment text does not explicitly mention this 
right, the Supreme Court has upheld the “freedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas [as] an 
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech” 
and assembly.160  The Court’s justification for this protection is 
consonant with concerns religious opponents to same-sex marriage 
would share:  “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of 
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group 
 
155 See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 n.3 (1991) (criticizing the Court’s use of the “hybrid” exception 
as “illustrative of poetic license”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and 
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) (“One suspects that the notion 
of ‘hybrid’ claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder . . . .”). 
156 See Clark, supra note 77, at 660 (describing a free exercise case barred by Smith 
that could potentially be made viable through the use of the hybrid-rights exception). 
157 A free speech claim could also comprise part of a hybrid rights claim or even 
constitute a stand-alone defense to same-sex marriage antidiscrimination laws; 
however, a free speech analysis lies beyond the confines of this Comment. 
158 WITTE, supra note 112, at 169 (2005) (“It is no small irony that today the free 
speech clause affords considerably more protection to religious liberty than the free 
exercise clause.”). 
159 The Court has recognized “a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in 
those activities protected by the First Amendment-—speech, assembly, petition for the 
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 618 (1984). 
160 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).   
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association . . . .”161  The expressive association right is correlative to 
the free speech right because it is sometimes only possible for an 
individual to have grievances heard or to obtain relief by banding 
together with other like-minded speakers.162  As discussed above, both 
the mere existence of a group and one’s membership in that group, 
which to some degree signifies assent to the group’s shared beliefs, 
can send powerful messages to members and non-members alike.163 
Like other First Amendment rights, the freedom of association 
right is not absolute.  Indeed, it is commonplace to find state and 
local laws prohibiting private groups and clubs from discriminating 
with respect to their membership, and the Supreme Court has held 
that such discrimination is only protected in cases of intimate 
association (meaning having only a few members) or where the 
discrimination is integral to expressive activity.164  The qualified nature 
of this right is especially relevant for religious entities that would seek 
to exclude same-sex marriage couples from leadership or other public 
positions that might suggest religious endorsement of their marriage 
status.165  Absent statutory exemptions, these organizations would have 
to rely on this circumscribed constitutional protection as articulated 
by the courts. 
 
161 Id.; cf. David B. Salmons, Toward a Fuller Understanding of Religious Exercise:  
Recognizing the Identity-Generative and Expressive Nature of Religious Devotion, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1243, 1245 (1995) (asserting that “[p]ublicly expressing one’s . . . membership in 
a class or group . . . is at the core of political speech”). 
162 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 107, at 1396 (regarding freedom of association as 
integral to free speech because “[g]roups have resources--in human capital and money-
-that a single person lacks”). 
163 Id. (noting that “the very existence of group support for an idea conveys a 
message”). 
164 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609 (holding that a national organization of men 
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five may not restrict its membership because of 
the state’s compelling interest in preventing discrimination and the absence of a 
finding that the inclusion of women would undermine the group’s expressive 
activities); see also Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) 
(holding that the forced admission of women to comply with a California law 
prohibiting sex discrimination did not infringe the club’s First Amendment rights). 
165 It is general Christian doctrine that one’s sexuality or views on same-sex 
marriage would not ordinarily preclude one from membership in a church, but a 
church may have legitimate concerns—just as the Boy Scouts did—about same-sex 
marriage proponents assuming leadership roles.  Even if a Christian church wanted to 
restrict its membership to heterosexuals, I know of no mainstream strand of 
Christianity whose tenets exclude homosexuals from membership because of their 
sexuality.  However, given explicit theology on same-sex marriage, any exclusion would 
have to be directly related to an expressive showing contradicting these specific 
teachings. 
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Importantly for religious institutions, the integral-to-expressive-
activity exception seems crafted precisely for the same-sex marriage 
context.  The leading case upholding the right of association and 
defining this discrimination exception is Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.166  
In Dale, the Court held that freedom of association protected the Boy 
Scouts, a private group dedicated to teaching moral and religious 
virtues, from violating New Jersey’s public accommodation 
antidiscrimination law when the Scouts chose to exclude an 
outspoken gay-rights activist from its membership.167  The Boy Scouts’ 
core values included guidelines that its scouts be “morally straight” 
and “clean,” and while the Scout’s internal documents were not 
specific that these goals indicated disapproval of homosexuality, the 
Supreme Court allowed the Boy Scouts to define for themselves what 
their teaching meant.168 
Given this policy, the Court had to determine whether Dale’s 
presence would “significantly burden” the Boy Scouts’ desire not to 
promote the acceptability of the homosexual lifestyle.169  Although 
Dale had been an exemplary scout otherwise, he publicly advocated 
his views favoring homosexuality on a number of occasions.170  The 
Court stated that it is proper to “give deference to an association’s 
view of what would impair its expression,” and the Court concluded 
that the Scouts’ decision to exclude Dale was permissible.171  
Importantly, the Court also noted that the expressive association right 
is not an impermeable “shield against antidiscrimination laws” just 
 
166 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
167 Id. at 644.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -5 (West 2002) (prohibiting 
discrimination in New Jersey’s public accommodations).  Due to state courts’ 
interpretations of New Jersey’s public accommodation law, it provides more substantial 
coverage than similar laws in other states.  Dale, 530 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court has given its public accommodation law “a 
more expansive coverage than most similar state statutes”). 
168 Id. at 651 (“We accept the Boy Scouts’ assertion.  We need not inquire further 
to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to 
homosexuality.”).  The Boy Scouts were also allowed to introduce evidence of several 
position statements advising against the appropriateness of scout leaders being openly 
gay and stating that homosexual conduct violates the Scout Oath.  Id. at 651-52. 
169 Id. at 653. 
170 Id. at 645 (noting that Dale served as co-president of his university’s 
Lesbian/Gay Alliance, was interviewed by a newspaper regarding his gay-rights 
advocacy, and was identified in the newspaper article photograph as the Lesbian/Gay 
Alliance co-president). 
171 Id. at 653. 
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because an organization decides acceptance of a member would 
damage its message.172 
The Court held that the test for whether an unwanted member 
violates expressive association was whether “the presence of that 
person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate 
public or private viewpoints.”173  Three factors were critical to the 
Court’s decision to allow the exclusion in this case:  First, Dale was not 
just a scout leader who happened to be homosexual; rather, he was a 
vocal and currently active community leader for gay rights.174  Second, 
the Boy Scouts actually and sincerely believed part of their identity or 
mission was to inculcate virtues that did not include homosexuality.175  
Finally, the Court was convinced that Dale’s “presence” as an adult 
member would “force the organization to send a message, both to the 
youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts 
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”176 
B.  Application of the Expressive Association Defense to the Ocean Grove 
Case 
How promising is Dale for religious institutions in the context of 
the current same-sex marriage debate?  The first point to underscore 
is that the right-of-association doctrine only protects religious groups 
and not religious believers individually.  However, within the context 
of religious groups, the Dale majority’s decision offers a remarkable 
parallel to the predicament faced by religious institutions on the issue 
of same-sex marriage. 
One issue hotly contested in Dale was the specificity with which the 
Boy Scouts had expressed their opposition to homosexuality in the 
past.  Instead of expressly declaring a moral stance against 
homosexuality, the Boy Scouts had expressed opposition using only 
comprehensive terms such as “morally straight.”177  The dissent 
believed that the Boy Scouts’ documents failed to assert anything 
specifically condemning homosexuality.178  The majority, however, did 
 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 648. 
174 Id. at 645 (noting that Dale was, among other things, co-president of his 
university’s Gay/Lesbian Alliance). 
175 Id. at 649-53 (“We cannot doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely holds this view.”). 
176 Id. at 653. 
177 Id. at 667 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
178 See id. at 665-71 (arguing that the Boy Scouts’ inclusion of terms like “morally 
straight” in the Scout Oath and Law did not support a finding that the organization 
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not require the Boy Scouts to use specific language regarding 
homosexuality and allowed the organization to self-interpret its more 
general language.179  Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that “it 
is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values 
because they disagree with those values or find them internally 
inconsistent.”180  Yet even under the stricter test advocated by the Dale 
dissent, many religious institutions would have little difficulty pointing 
to internal religious documents disavowing support for same-sex 
marriage.181  Furthermore, given the Dale Court’s position that 
internal inconsistency is not a dispositive flaw, courts should not be 
able to balance a religious institution’s proscriptions against same-sex 
marriage with other seemingly contradictory principles generally 
promoting openness, tolerance, or love. 
Religious organizations, even those within the same 
denomination, do not always agree on every point of theology or 
doctrine, and this observation is nowhere more accurate than in the 
United States, a country known for its religious diversity.182  Certainly 
there are some individual churches, religious organizations, or even 
entire Christian denominations that already affirm or are moving 
toward affirming same-sex marriage.183  However, the Dale Court 
makes it clear that unanimity of opinion is not required for First 
Amendment protection of expressive association.  The majority stated 
that “[t]he fact that the [Boy Scouts] does not trumpet its views from 
the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not 
mean that its views receive no First Amendment protection.”184  This 
language is also beneficial for religious groups opposed to same-sex 
 
taught opposition to homosexuality, especially in light of the fact that they directed 
boys to seek advice on sexual matters from other sources). 
179 Id. at 650 (majority opinion). 
180 Id. at 651. 
181 Many Roman Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical, Jewish, and Muslim groups, as 
parts of established, institutionalized religions, would be able to cite internal 
documents similarly specific to those cited by the Ocean Grove Methodists.  See infra 
note 206. 
182 Justice Scalia has quipped that while France is famous for having two religions 
and many different cheeses, the United States is famous for having just two cheeses 
and many different religions.  Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, A Conversation on the 
Constitution:  Perspectives from Active Liberty and A Matter of Interpretation (Dec. 5, 
2006) (remarks of Justice Antonin Scalia), http://www.acslaw.org/node/3909. 
183 See Graff, supra note 155, at 37 (“Several Christian denominations have also 
recognized the religious value and spiritual dignity that characterizes many same-sex 
relationships.”). 
184 Dale, 530 U.S. at 656. 
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marriage:  Even if disapproval of same-sex marriage is the doctrine of 
many religious organizations, that belief is not always trumpeted from 
rooftops because it is a divisive issue.  For any number of reasons, 
religious organizations may choose to minimize potential sources of 
controversy and conflict, even if the view is important to their 
identity.185  Religious organizations are also comprised of diverse 
individuals, not all of whom would personally assent to every religious 
tenet the organization holds.186  The Dale Court makes clear that this 
reality presents no limitation to the expressive association analysis.  
The Court affirmed that “the First Amendment simply does not 
require that every member of a group agree on every issue in order 
for the group’s policy to be ‘expressive association.’”187  Moreover, 
given that opposition to same-sex marriage is not the raison d’être of 
any denomination, the Court affirmed that the association need not 
be organized for the “purpose” of advocating that particular 
expression.188  Finally, the majority in Dale rejected the relevance of 
Justice Stevens’s comments in dissent regarding the increasing public 
acceptance of homosexuality.189  Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded 
that this evolution is no argument at all to those who continue to 
reject more tolerant views towards homosexuality.190  One purpose of a 
constitutional protection is to guarantee protection precisely when 
 
185 See, e.g., Interview with William P. Wood, Senior Minister of First Presbyterian 
Church, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 21, 2003) (“We are not an issues church.”). 
186 One commentator, discussing the increasing acceptance of same-sex 
relationships within certain religious groups, observed that  
[i]ncreasingly, religious organizations, congregations, and individual spiritual 
leaders have concluded that their faiths require them to support equal 
marriage rights for same-sex couples.  These beliefs have taken root among an 
array of religious communities, including mainstream denominations of 
American Judaism and Christianity.  Even within religions that formally 
oppose same-sex marriage, individuals and organizations continue to agitate 
for doctrinal change. 
Graff, supra note 155, at 24.  
187 Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. 
188 Id.; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that St. Patrick’s Day parade organizers could prevent 
gay-rights advocates from advocating their views at the parade despite the fact that the 
parade was not held for the purpose of espousing any views on homosexuality). 
189 Dale, 530 U.S. at 699-700 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 660 (majority 
opinion) (dismissing Justice Stevens’s evidence as inapposite). 
190 Id. (“[T]he fact that an idea may be embraced and advocated by increasing 
numbers of people is all the more reason to protect the First Amendment rights of 
those who wish to voice a different view.”). 
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one’s beliefs or actions are opposed by a majority:  “The First 
Amendment protects expression, be it of a popular variety or not.”191 
How might the expressive association defense set forth above 
apply to the conflict between religious institutions and same-sex 
marriage that this Comment contemplates?  The Ocean Grove case 
mentioned at the beginning of this Comment provides an excellent 
template for this analysis. 
Resolution of the Ocean Grove case is still pending, but in 
December 2008, the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights found 
probable cause that the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association 
violated New Jersey antidiscrimination law when it refused to allow a 
lesbian civil union ceremony to occur on its premises.192  Ocean Grove 
contested the ruling and stated that, consistent with its devoutly 
Methodist purposes, history, and goals, the use of its property for a 
same-sex civil commitment ceremony would violate its sincerely held 
religious principles and expressive association rights.  In July 2009, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the 
case to the federal district court to decide Ocean Grove’s request for 
declaratory relief on constitutional grounds regarding all of its 
property.193 
Before proceeding further, a more detailed examination of the 
facts of the Ocean Grove case is in order.  Ocean Grove dates back to 
1869 when it was founded as an explicitly Christian ministry for 
worship, education, and recreation in a Christian seaside setting.194  
The New Jersey legislature incorporated the organization for the 
specific purpose of serving as a “Christian” resort for United 
Methodist members and friends, and from its inception the 
organization has described its mission in explicitly religious terms.195  
 
191 Id. 
192 See Op. N.J. Att’y Gen., Div. on Civil Rights, No. PN34XB-03008 (Dec. 29, 
2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-
06CMA.pdf; see also Associated Press, supra note 3 (reporting on the finding of 
probable cause). 
193 Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-
Papaleo, Nos. 07-4253, 07-4543, 2009 WL 2048914, at *1-2 (3d Cir. July 15, 2009). 
194 Act of March 3, 1870, ch. 157, 1870 N.J. Laws 397 (incorporating Ocean Grove 
“for the purpose of providing and maintaining for the members and friends of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church a proper, convenient and desirable permanent camp 
meeting ground and [C]hristian seaside resort”). 
195 MORRIS S. DANIELS, THE STORY OF OCEAN GROVE 35 (1919) (quoting Ocean 
Grove’s first president describing the Camp Meeting Association’s “preeminently 
Religious” goals and stating that its “primary object” is to “keep its eye to the glory of 
God” and “to promote the highest forms of religious life”). 
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Indeed, Ocean Grove’s first president stated that all would be 
welcome provided that they understood the association’s Christian 
purposes and had “sympathy with our objects.”196  Today, the 
association’s bylaws stipulate that all voting Board of Trustees 
members must be United Methodists.197  While the association leases 
some of the land it owns in the city of Ocean Grove (it owns the whole 
community), it controls the Boardwalk Pavilion at issue in this case, 
which has housed worship services since the 1880s and is used today 
for worship services, children’s Bible School programs, summer 
concerts, and Gospel Music Ministry programs, which are held two to 
three times daily during the summer.198  “The Association considers all 
of its events to be instrumental in bringing members of the 
community to faith in Jesus Christ.”199  Although the public is welcome 
to occupy the facility when it is unused, the public must “abide by 
[Ocean Grove’s] rules and regulations” when doing so.200  Finally, 
while the Pavilion has on occasion been rented to the public in the 
past for wedding ceremonies, it “has not . . . been made generally 
available to the public for any other purposes.”201 
The plaintiffs in Ocean Grove are Harriet Bernstein and her 
partner, Luisa Paster, who sought to rent the Boardwalk Pavilion as 
the location for their private, same-sex civil union commitment 
ceremony.  Ocean Grove denied the couple’s request to use the 
facility for this purpose, citing “the Association’s religious beliefs as 
reflected in the United Methodist Book of Discipline and the Holy 
Bible.”202  After unsuccessfully petitioning Ocean Grove’s board of 
trustees for reconsideration, the couple filed a grievance with the New 
Jersey Division on Civil Rights.203 
How should this glimpse into the ongoing conflict of same-sex 
marriage and religious freedom be resolved under the expressive 
 
196 Id. 
197 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5, Ocean 
Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, No. 
3:07-cv-03802 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2007). 
198 Id. at 7. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 8. 
203 A second lesbian couple, Janice Moore and Emily Sonnessa, also challenged 
Ocean Grove’s denial, but the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights found no probable 
cause for their allegations.  See Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United 
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, Nos. 07-4253, 07-4543, 2009 WL 2048914, at *1-2 
n.2 (3d Cir. July 15, 2009). 
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association doctrine?  In the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, Ocean Grove lost its motion for a preliminary 
injunction against the state’s enforcement action.  However, the 
court’s decision rested on federal abstention grounds and did not 
reach the merits of Ocean Grove’s First Amendment arguments.204 
The test that Ocean Grove must pass is whether the presence of 
the same-sex civil commitment ceremony would affect “in a significant 
way the [association’s] ability to advocate [its] public or private 
viewpoints.”205  First, did the ceremony implicate one of the 
association’s public or private viewpoints?  Of central import in Dale 
was the manner in which the Boy Scouts had—both prior to and 
during litigation—announced their opposition to homosexuality as an 
important goal of their organization.  Whereas the Boy Scouts had 
only ambiguous general phrases that opposed advocating 
homosexuality prior to litigation, Ocean Grove, as an arm of the 
United Methodist Church, could point to specific, official church 
documents to detail the institution’s position on homosexuality and 
same-sex marriage.  Ocean Grove could specifically cite to the United 
Methodist Book of Discipline to make utterly clear its stance on same-sex 
marriage and homosexuality.206  Even were these texts less clear, 
Ocean Grove would be free to interpret its own views on whether 
using its facility for a same-sex commitment ceremony would violate 
its expressive interests.207  Given the legal test from Dale, this freedom 
 
204 Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-
Papaleo, No. 07-3802, 2007 WL 3349787 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007) (holding that the 
Younger abstention doctrine counseled the federal district court to allow the New Jersey 
courts to continue adjudicating the pending state proceeding due to issues that 
implicated important state interests and plaintiff’s ability to raise constitutional 
challenges in state court). 
205 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
206 On marriage, the Book of Discipline both affirms the Church’s view of traditional 
marriage and disapproves of same-sex marriage.  THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE 
UNITED METHODIST CHURCH 2008, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES, ¶ 161C (2009) (“We affirm the 
sanctity of the marriage covenant that is expressed in love, mutual support, personal 
commitment, and shared fidelity between a man and a woman.”); id. ¶ 341 
(“Ceremonies that celebrate homosexual unions shall not be conducted by our 
ministers and shall not be conducted in our churches.”).  Regarding homosexuality, 
the Book of Discipline states clear opposition to the compatibility of homosexual practice 
with Methodist teaching.  Id. ¶ 161F (noting that the “United Methodist Church does 
not condone the practice of homosexuality and consider[s] this practice incompatible 
with Christian teaching”). 
207 Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 
U.S. 557, 575 (1995) (“[I]t boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a 
particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s 
power to control.”). 
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of choice, the association’s history, and the Methodist Church’s 
unambiguous texts all point to a sincerely held expressive belief 
justifying exclusion of the same-sex commitment ceremony on the 
association’s property. 
Second, does the nature of the threat posed by the same-sex civil 
commitment ceremony pose a “significant” expressive harm to Ocean 
Grove?  In Dale, the threat arose from the fact that membership in the 
Boy Scouts would be extended to a publicly known, outspoken leader 
of the gay rights movement.  In Ocean Grove’s case, there is arguably 
less of a threat from the notoriety of the couple—neither individual 
had been a well-known gay rights advocate—but more of a threat from 
the act they would be performing on Ocean Grove’s property.  The 
fact that same-sex civil commitment ceremonies never officially occur 
in a United Methodist Church worship space strongly suggests that the 
occurrence of even one such event would generate significant 
publicity.  Just as there has been media interest in the developments 
of this case, presumably there would have been public notice that a 
same-sex ceremony was performed. 
Had the ceremony occurred, the public would be justified in 
wondering whether the United Methodist Church had sanctioned the 
ceremony, whether the church had changed its longstanding policy 
against same-sex marriage, whether there was internal dispute about 
the status of that longstanding policy, or whether same-sex 
ceremonies would now be a regular occurrence in United Methodist 
Church facilities.  For the majority in Dale, it was not Dale’s expected 
use of the bully pulpit or any other public action that the Boy Scouts 
believed would hinder its expressive association ability; rather, it was 
the mere presence of Dale as a member that would have potentially 
caused the Boy Scouts to convey a message of acceptance to 
homosexuality that it does not wish to convey.208 
Given this analysis, and the Dale Court’s admission that it 
“must . . . give deference to an association’s view of what would impair 
its expression,” the harm in this case appears at least as damaging as 
the harm in Dale.209  Under a doctrine of expressive association similar 
 
208 Dale, 530 U.S. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority . . . does not rest its 
conclusion on the claim that Dale will use his position as a Bully pulpit.  Rather, it 
contends that Dale’s mere presence among the Boy Scouts will itself force the group to 
convey a message about homosexuality . . . .”). 
209 Id. at 653 (majority opinion).  The effect of the damage in the Ocean Grove 
case is not distinguishable from Dale simply because the lesbian couple did not seek to 
become “members” of Ocean Grove. 
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to the one enunciated in Dale, it is likely that the Ocean Grove 
pavilion owners would have a strong chance of mounting an equally 
successful defense. 
C.  Application of the Expressive Association Doctrine to the Ocean Grove 
Case According to Justice Stevens’s Dale Dissent 
Given that Dale is the Court’s first major attempt at giving shape to 
the expressive association doctrine—and that the Dale Court divided 
five to four—how might the Ocean Grove case come out under the 
doctrine as understood by Justice Stevens in the Dale dissent?   In 
some respects, the facts of the Ocean Grove case ameliorate problems 
identified with the majority’s analysis in Dale.  However, Justice 
Stevens’s dissent appears animated by a fundamentally different view 
towards how protective the courts should be of the expressive rights of 
private groups and the potential discrimination that individuals could 
face as a result.  Even if one ultimately concludes, as I do, that the 
Ocean Grove case would likely come out the same way as under Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s understanding of the doctrine, there is no 
shortage of ammunition in Justice Stevens’s opinion suggesting a 
court could resolve the Ocean Grove case differently. 
First, how does Justice Stevens’s dissent view expressive association 
law?  The dissent exhibited less affinity for expressive association law 
but did acknowledge the existence of such a right, citing the Court’s 
decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.210  But the dissent was also 
quick to point out that there is no absolute right to association for 
expressive purposes and that before the Dale decision the Court had 
“never once” found an expressive association right that trumped state 
antidiscrimination law.211  The dissent focused its attention on two 
prior expressive association cases, Rotary Club212 and Roberts, and 
highlighted that expressive association claims failed in both because 
the groups were simply trying to enforce “exclusionary membership” 
policies and that allowing a member to join against their wishes would 
not jeopardize their message.213  Justice Stevens’s dissent thus made 
clear that to qualify for protection, a group must have more than just 
 
210 Id. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 
(1984)). 
211 Id. at 679. 
212 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
213 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 682 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing principles 
articulated in Jaycees and Rotary Club regarding how to prevail on a claim of expressive 
association). 
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“some connection” between its expression and its exclusions.214  The 
dissent’s overall tenor suggested that this bloc of the Court envisions a 
more limited expressive association doctrine than does the Dale 
majority, particularly when used to avoid compliance with important 
state antidiscrimination laws.215 
The dissent likewise held a different view towards what a group 
must do to make its policy position clear and to connect that policy to 
the group’s expressive activities.  According to the dissent, the Court 
should make an active inquiry into the content of the group’s message 
to ensure that it actually articulates and holds a certain view and to 
consider whether the group’s message would be “significantly 
affected” by compliance with antidiscrimination law.216  Presumably 
out of a concern that groups not be allowed to discriminate by 
contriving sham beliefs,217 Justice Stevens’s framework would require 
an organization to show, with evidence adopted prior to the litigation, 
that its position was unequivocal,218 internally consistent,219 and 
publicly expressed.220  Contrary to the majority’s approach in allowing 
a group to testify itself regarding what it believes and how contrary 
expression would harm its mission, Justice Stevens’s approach 
demands exacting proof and anticipation about how a group’s views 
might be challenged in litigation.  Despite this more rigorous analysis, 
Ocean Grove would quite possibly still meet this heightened test 
because of its official connection to the United Methodist Church and 
the specific, public documents that describe Methodist theology 
regarding same-sex marriage. 
Even with the facts in the Ocean Grove case, that outcome is not 
guaranteed when groups must prove the clarity and certainty of their 
positions without the benefit of any contemporaneous commentary 
on how the group interprets its documentation.  For Ocean Grove, a 
 
214 Id. 
215 Justice Stevens opened his dissent with a rousing recognition of New Jersey’s 
desire to “eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types” from society.  Id. 
at 663 (quoting Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J. 
1978)). 
216 Id. at 686 (“[T]hat inquiry requires our independent analysis, rather than 
deference to a group’s litigating posture.”). 
217 Id. at 687 (“If this Court were to defer . . . there would be no way to mark the 
proper boundary between genuine exercises of the right to associate . . . and sham 
claims . . . .”). 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 671-73. 
220 Id. at 672. 
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court resolute not to uphold its rights to expressive association could 
offer a number of arguments to combat the group’s own 
interpretation of its beliefs.  For one, the court could argue that the 
group’s connection with the United Methodist Church is too 
attenuated for it to rely on the national church’s theological 
statements.  This concern could be particularly damaging if a court 
were persuaded by the fact that some para-church organizations are 
more liberal than the official orthodoxy of the national church itself 
and that, without specific incorporation of the national church’s 
theology or documents, the para-church’s beliefs would not be 
sufficiently articulated. 
Perhaps as well, a court could attempt to use conflicting 
statements made in church documents to suggest the lack of a 
coherent message.  For example, despite concluding that 
homosexuality is inconsistent with church teaching, the United 
Methodist Book of Discipline states that “all persons” need the church’s 
ministry, that homosexuals are persons of “sacred worth,” and that the 
church’s ministry is “for and with all persons.”221  Even though the Boy 
Scouts explicitly stated that homosexuality and leadership in scouting 
were incompatible, the Court decided that the Boy Scout’s position 
was “far more equivocal” when its whole context was considered.222  
Further, with the requirement that the belief be expressed publicly 
rather than relegated exclusively to internal documents, one wonders 
whether courts would entertain extensive examinations into how often 
the policy on same-sex marriage had been publicly discussed, 
emphasized, or referenced when Ocean Grove formulated its policies 
for renting the pavilion for marriage services. 
Depending on one’s perspective, Justice Stevens’s approach 
displays the virtue or vice of a court telling a religious organization 
what morality should mean to them instead of following the 
presumption of letting the private organization interpret and express 
its own values.  Naturally, an organization should have to present 
some reasonable evidence that its claim is not a sham, but Justice 
Stevens’s approach seems to insist that a private organization prove its 
own views not just to the point of reasonableness but so that those 
beliefs could stand up in court against any potential inconsistencies.223 
 
221 BOOK OF DISCIPLINE, supra note 206, ¶ 161F. 
222 Dale, 530 U.S. at 671, 676 (“[Boy Scouts] never took any clear and unequivocal 
position on homosexuality.”). 
223 See, e.g., id. at 675. 
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From the perspective of religious institutions, Justice Stevens’s 
approach presents several challenges.  Such a rigorous test may 
prevent a private organization from adjusting its views in a sensitive 
way so as not to create distracting controversy:  Justice Stevens’s 
dissent emphasized the fact that the Boy Scouts did not make public 
their more explicit policies about how to handle homosexual 
leadership.224  Failure to do so does not necessarily mean that a 
group’s views are not sincerely held, but especially in matters as 
delicate as opposition to same-sex marriage, sometimes treading 
lightly with a more subtle footprint is the more pragmatic course.  
These same concerns might prompt an organization to reject taking 
“any clear and unequivocal position on homosexuality” as Justice 
Stevens’s dissent suggested is required.225 
These same complaints pertain to the way Justice Stevens’s 
approach would consider the prospective harm that would occur to a 
group’s expression.  As opposed to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s approach 
that allows the group itself to decide whether and how severe an 
impediment exists to the institution’s expressive association, under 
Justice Stevens’s approach this matter is for the court to decide.  It is, 
however, not difficult to imagine a court accepting the documentary 
proof of a group’s legitimate belief against same-sex marriage but 
holding that allowing one or a handful of same-sex ceremonies to take 
place indirectly under its auspices would not be a substantial burden 
to the group’s expression.226  All told, even under Justice Stevens’s 
approach, Ocean Grove may reasonably expect to satisfy the 
requirements for a successful expressive association defense in its case, 
but Justice Stevens’s approach presents more serious hurdles; 
presumably, fewer religious institutions would qualify under that 
regime. 
 
224 Id. 
225 Justice Stevens concluded that despite the Boy Scouts’ internal policy 
statements declaring that the Boy Scouts do “not believe that homosexuality and 
leadership in Scouting are appropriate,” “nothing in these policy statements supports” 
the Boy Scouts’ claim.  Id. at 671, 676 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
226 See id. at 684 (“The evidence before this Court makes it exceptionally clear that 
[Boy Scouts] has, at most, simply adopted an exclusionary membership policy and has 
no shared goal of disapproving of homosexuality.”). 
BOLD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009  12:25 PM 
2009] Vows to Collide 229 
D.  Implications of the Expressive Association  
Doctrine for Religious Institutions 
Given the expressive association doctrine and its articulation in 
Dale, the defense does appear to offer a vibrant source of First 
Amendment protection for religious institutions that seek to avoid 
liability for violating antidiscrimination laws with respect to same-sex 
marriage.  Under the majority’s framework in Dale, the case is easier to 
prove, because the right of the private group to state for itself its 
beliefs and the expressive consequences of violating those beliefs 
leaves less room for a court’s exercise of its independent judgment.  
Yet, even under Justice Stevens’s paradigm, religious groups that have 
documentation of their specific beliefs will benefit as long as their 
doctrines and views on same-sex marriage are clear and well-
preserved.  Though the legal case would be more difficult under this 
framework, it is plausible that religious groups could still find 
sufficient protection in many cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the Massachusetts and California Supreme Courts’ bold 
declarations to the contrary, if anything is clear in the wake of the 
recent landmark same-sex marriage decisions, it is the assurance of a 
turbulent future for the free exercise of religious proponents of 
traditional marriage.  Because marriage is a fundamentally religious 
concept for most American religious institutions, government 
enforcement of same-sex marriage poses a challenge to many religious 
institutions on religious and not just political grounds.  Given 
traditional and still-prevailing theological views about the nature and 
scope of religious activity, many religious institutions will argue that it 
is their religious duty to offer a public defense of traditional marriage 
and to avoid any public involvement contrary to their expressive 
identity.  As the Ocean Grove case illustrates, this religious duty will in 
many instances directly conflict with state or federal same-sex 
antidiscrimination laws. 
Ironically, to confront this new wave of legal conflict, religious 
institutions that oppose same-sex marriage will likely find firmer 
constitutional ground under the expressive association doctrine than 
under the Free Exercise Clause.  Despite at least one prominent 
interpretation of the Clause’s text and intent for affording strong free 
exercise rights to religious institutions, the Court’s jurisprudence in 
Smith and Lukumi has stymied robust constitutional protection against 
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neutral, generally applicable statutes.  The expressive association 
doctrine, however, especially as articulated by the Dale Court, offers a 
potentially more successful First Amendment defense for religious 
institutions seeking to avoid liability for violating same-sex 
antidiscrimination laws. 
 
